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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical scenarios1: 
A young U.S. marine dies in combat in Iraq. His widow and heir 
petitions to have access to his webmail account, but the webmail 
provider stands by its terms and conditions, which forbid the transfer 
of account passwords and require termination of the account and 
deletion of its contents on notice of an accountholder’s death. The 
webmail provider agrees, however, after a court order is obtained, to 
transfer the contents of the inbox and folders to the widow as a 
digital download without handing over passwords. On examination, 
the widow finds to her distress that the e-mails provide evidence of a 
homosexual affair that the marine was having with a fellow soldier; 
some of the e-mails say explicitly that she was never to know about 
it.2 
A well-known novelist dies suddenly. During her life, she had made 
it clear she did not want any unfinished works published on death in 
case they were sub-standard or revealed secrets she had not yet had a 
chance to acquire permissions to disclose. She dies having destroyed 
all paper manuscripts but without having destroyed one novel in 
progress, which is stored in the cloud on an intermediary host 
service, CloudDrive. Her will leaves everything to her literary 
executor, Alice, who is aware of these concerns. Meanwhile, 
however, her sole child, Ben, persuades CloudDrive, which has no 
published rules on post-mortem access, to give him access to a 
download of the unfinished novel, by showing the death certificate 
and proving his relationship to the deceased as her only child. He 
then downloads and sells the novel for a large sum to an international 
publisher.3 
A teenage girl dies having overdosed on drugs at a party, and her 
Facebook page becomes a shrine to her memory, with friends leaving 
notes and sharing pictures and memories of the deceased in the 
 
1 These scenarios are drawn partly from existing case law, and partly from discussions in 
Dedicated Section on Post-Mortem Privacy. See infra note 3 (case law); Lilian Edwards, 
Editorial, Post-mortem Privacy, in 10:1 SCRIPTED 1 (2013); Elaine Kasket, Access to the Digital 
Self in Life and Death: Privacy in the Context of Posthumously Persistent Facebook Profiles, in 
10:1 SCRIPTED 7 (2013); Edina Harbinja, Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect Post-
Mortem Privacy and What Could Be The Potential Alternatives?, in 10:1 SCRIPTED 19 (2013); 
Damien McCallig, Private But Eventually Public: Why Copyright in Unpublished Works Matters 
in the Digital Age, in 10:1 SCRIPTED 39 (2013); Jan Bikker, Disaster Victim Identification in the 
Information Age: The Use Of Personal Data, Post-Mortem Privacy and the Rights of the Victim’s 
Relatives, in 10:1 SCRIPTED 57 (2013). 
2 Drawn from the facts of the U.S. case of in re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. 
Ct. 2005), but with significant changes to the facts. For further explanation, see infra Part III. 
3 Compare the case of Nabokov who similarly attempted and failed to prevent the publication of 
post-mortem works. See Alexis Kirschbaum, The Inside Story of Nabokov’s Last Work, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2009, 08:18 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/nov/17/inside-
story-nabokov-last-work. 
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comments. When her parents, who are not social media users, are 
finally alerted to this, they are distressed at some of the posts on the 
profile relating to drinking and drugs. As nearest family, they ask 
Facebook to close the page down.4 They also ask Facebook to give 
them access to Friends-locked posts they cannot see, so they can find 
out who might have encouraged their daughter’s lifestyle.5 Later, 
they find pictures of their daughter’s unconscious body at the party 
have leaked on to the Internet and have “gone viral.” 
These are all scenarios that intuitively concern what we shall call 
post-mortem privacy: rights of privacy for the dead. Post-mortem 
privacy is not a recognised term of art or institutional category in 
general succession law or even privacy literature. It may be termed the 
right of a person to preserve and control what becomes of his or her 
reputation, dignity, integrity, secrets or memory after death. While of 
established concern in disciplines such as psychology, counselling, 
anthropology and other humanities and social sciences,6 this notion has, 
until recently, received relatively little attention, and then of only a 
scattered, conflicted and disparate kind, within law.7 It is now, however, 
emerging, we will argue, as an appropriate topic of public and scholarly 
legal concern,8 particularly due to the growth in creation, sharing and 
acquisition of digital assets which often have a peculiarly personal and 
intimate character, and also happen to be voluminous, shareable, hard to 
destroy and difficult to categorise under current legal norms of property 
 
4 See Kasket, supra note 1; see also Jefferson Puff, Brazil Judge Orders Facebook Memorial 
Page Removed, BBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-22286569. In this case, a mother successfully petitioned a Brazilian court to order the 
complete deletion rather than mere memorialisation of a Facebook page of her twenty-four year 
old deceased daughter. Facebook itself had apparently memorialised the page and refused to take 
it down completely. The mother told journalists, “[t]his ‘wailing wall’ just makes me suffer too 
much.” Id. The judge was reported as agreeing that the memorial wall went against “the right of 
personal dignity” and “inflicted great suffering on the mother.” Id. 
5 This part of the scenario is drawn from the facts (with alterations) of in re Request for Order 
Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 
2012). 
6 See, e.g., DYING, DEATH AND GRIEF IN AN ONLINE UNIVERSE (Carla J. Sofka, Kathleen R. 
Gilbert & Illene N. Cupit eds., 2012); Brian Carroll & Katie Landry, Logging on and Letting Out: 
Using Online Social Networks to Grieve and to Mourn, 30 BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 341 
(2010) [hereinafter Logging on and Letting Out]; Dennis Klass, Continuing Conversations About 
Continuing Bonds, 30 DEATH STUD. 843 (2006). 
7 See, e.g., Dedicated Section on Post-Mortem Privacy, supra note 1. Additionally, on October 8, 
2012, the Amsterdam Privacy Conference hosted a panel discussion entitled Death and Post-
Mortem Privacy in the Digital Age. For more information, see Conference Programme and Book 
of Abstracts, APC 2012, http://www.apc2012.org/content/conference-pro-gramme-and-book-
abstracts (last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
8 See, e.g., Lilian Edwards & Edina Harbinja, What Happens to My Facebook Profile When I 
Die? Legal Issues Around Transmission of Digital Assets on Death, in DIGITAL LEGACY AND 
INTERACTION: POST-MORTEM ISSUES (Cristiano Maciel & Vinicius Pereira eds., forthcoming 
2013); Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 143 (2012); Deven R. Desai, 
Property, Persona, and Preservation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (2008). 
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or rights. 
As we shall see below, the conventional wisdom, especially in 
common-law states such as the United States and United Kingdom, is 
that the law does not protect post-mortem privacy. We shall argue, 
however, that post-mortem privacy is deserving of post-mortem 
protection in the changed circumstances of the digital era, and that, 
while it is currently somewhat protected, that protection lies not in any 
single overriding principle or legal institution, but rather via a range of 
legal instruments and institutions, which vary in effect, origin and 
purpose from legal system to legal system. Legal institutions that can be 
deployed to protect post-mortem privacy may include the laws of 
privacy, breach of confidence, intellectual property, personality, 
publicity, defamation, succession, executry and trusts, and data 
protection. We outline below the contours of legal protection for 
persona interests after death, and discuss their drawbacks from a 
comparative perspective. In particular, as European writers, we draw 
attention to the lack of protection for a deceased’s personal data in 
terms of the EC Data Protection Directive, even though this is 
recognised as the principle means of protection of informational privacy 
in EU member states. We will show that stark disparities in legal 
protection, actual or potential, arise between civilian and common law 
jurisdictions, with civilian systems more inclined, as a matter of history 
and philosophy, to show respect for the dignity, honour and reputation, 
and hence the privacy, of the dead. 
Notwithstanding such general legal protection, however, regulation 
of both the privacy and property rights of the deceased will often fall in 
the first instance to be determined by the contractual rules and norms of 
digital intermediary platforms, such as social networks, where digital 
assets are most often stored, created or shared. Since the dominant 
intermediaries in the various Western web 2.0 markets are primarily, 
though not exclusively, U.S. based, this may negate the sympathetic 
disposition of civilian systems, leaving poor protection for the post-
mortem privacy of the deceased in more than just common law 
countries. 
Finally, we will briefly consider what the next steps may be for 
taking post-mortem privacy more seriously in a digital, globalised and 
intermediarised world, and ask if breaking privacy into “negative” and 
“positive” variations might be a way forward. 
I. DIGITAL ASSETS 
Within this Article, “digital assets” are defined widely and not 
exclusively to include a range of intangible information goods 
associated with the online or digital world, including: social network 
profiles (on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+ or 
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LinkedIn); e-mails, tweets, databases, etc.; in-game virtual assets (e.g., 
items bought, found or built in worlds such as Second Life, World of 
Warcraft, Lineage.); digitised text, image, music or sound (e.g., video, 
film and e-book files); passwords to various accounts associated with 
the provision of digital goods and services, either as buyer, user or 
trader (e.g., to eBay, Amazon, Facebook, YouTube.); domain names; 
two- or three-dimensional personality-related images or icons (such as 
user icons on LiveJournal or avatars in Second Life); and the myriad of 
digital assets emerging as commodities capable of being assigned worth 
(e.g., “zero day exploits” or bugs in software which antagonists can 
exploit).9 
Palfrey and others assert that the growth of the Internet and 
associated information- and network-technologies has created a tribe of 
“digital natives,”10 who create, store, share and access an enormous 
amount of digital assets online daily. Alongside, the number of Internet 
users worldwide, “born digital” and later arriving, continues to rise,11 as 
much among the “silver surfers” as the youth demographic.12 Although 
not much discussed in the optimistic world of Web 2.0, by nature, a 
significant number of these living “digital lives” die every day.13 Over 
the last few years, public and media interest in what happens to digital 
assets after death, and whether the wishes of decedents will have legal 
affect where they conflict with the wishes of families or platforms, has 
 
9 LILIAN EDWARDS, LAW AND THE INTERNET 687–90 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 
3d ed. 2009). 
10 Palfrey and Gasser define digital natives as individuals that satisfy the following criteria: born 
after 1980, have access to digital technology, and have skills to use digital technology “in 
relatively advanced ways.” See John Palfrey & Urs Gasser, Reclaiming an Awkward Term: What 
we Might Learn from “Digital Natives,” 7 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 33, 37–38 (2011). 
Cheatham defines digital natives as a generation that has never known a world without digital 
technologies. See Cheryl Cheatham, Public Relations: Dancing with Digital Natives: A Great 
Resource for Understanding Those Who Have Grown up with Digital Technology, 16 AM. ASS’N 
OF L. LIBR. SPECTRUM 8 (2012). 
11 For example, as of June 2013, Facebook had 1.15 billion active users worldwide. Newsroom: 
Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
12 See KATHRYN ZICKUHR & MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, OLDER ADULTS AND INTERNET USE (2012); Laura Roberts & Harry 
Wallop, Silver Surfers Increase by One Million Over the Last Year, THE TELEGRAPH (June 30, 
2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/7862234/Silver-surfers-
increase-by-one-million-over-the-last-year.html; Press Release, DB Research, Thomas F. Dapp & 
Hannah Berscheid, Silver Surfers: The Importance of Older Generations for the Internet (August 
20, 2013). 
13 As of March 2012 it was estimated there are at least 30 million profiles on Facebook relating to 
dead people. See Alicia Eler, “I Wanna Live Forever,” or How We Die on Social Networks, 
READWRITE, (Mar. 6, 2012), http://readwrite.com/2012/03/06/i_wanna_live_forever_or_how_we
_die_on_social_netwo. Research suggests that approximately 375,000 Facebook users in the 
United States die every year. Mazzone, supra note 8, at 1647; see also Nathan Lustig, 2.89m 
Facebook Users Will Die in 2012, 580,000 in the USA, NATHANLUSTIG.COM (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.nathanlustig.com/2012/06/06/2-89m-facebook-users-will-die-in-2012-580000-in-the-
usa/.  
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slowly risen and become widespread.14 
In emerging legal discourse, disputes over digital assets on death 
can be usefully divided as related either to their pure economic value, or 
to their non-economic value (what might be called their dignitary or 
personal value). Domain names, for example, are obvious economic 
assets that may be crucial to the branding and thus the profitability of a 
business. In a family business, not only who inherits the domain name 
itself, but also who gets the e-mail notification of the upcoming need to 
re-register, may be controversial issues. Similarly, many outlet 
businesses nowadays operate exclusively on eBay and, again, who 
inherits that account (i.e., the password and login), the money attached 
to the account, and any connected on-going auctions will be a serious 
matter. Virtual assets in game worlds often represent the fruit of 
thousands of hours of labour (if game playing can be called labour)15 
and there is already a substantial amount of ethical and legal literature 
regarding their value, sale and the conditions required for 
transferability.16 Photos, blogs and text (i.e., spontaneous poems) shared 
on a celebrity’s social network profile—or those who die and later 
become famous—are likely soon to be of economic value, just as an 
 
14 For a random selection from an enormous grey literature, see Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife: 
What happens to your online accounts when you die?, NBCNEWS (June 1, 2012), http://
rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-
online-accounts-when-you-die?lite; Evan Carroll, What Happens to Your Facebook Account 
When You Die? THE DIGITAL BEYOND (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/
2012/02/what-happens-to-your-facebook-account-when-you-die/; Jagat Shah, Digital Life After 
Death: America One Step Ahead. On Your Passing, Your Online Presence Will Remain. But 
Should It?, MORRISONS SOLICITORS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.morrlaw.com/news/digital-life-
after-death-america-one-step-ahead; Rebecca Herold, How to Protect Your Privacy After You 
Die, INFOSEC ISLAND (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/3537-How-to-
Protect-Your-Privacy-After-You-Die.html; Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-line, PROB. & 
PROP., July/August 2011, at 36; Lisa Foy, Is There Life After Death for Your Digital Assets?, 
JDSUPRA LAW NEWS (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/is-there-life-after-
death-for-your-digit-97080/ (“Digital assets. It is a phrase that is currently trending among legal 
commentators and Canadians alike.”). 
15 Playing games as piecework to create commercially transferable assets (or levels of play) is 
often called gold-farming, and usually done by developing world players on low wages to sell to 
time-poor developed world players. See Julian Dibbell, The Life of a Chinese Goldfarmer, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (June 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-
t.html?_r=0. 
16 See, e.g., Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on 
the Cyberian Frontier (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=294828; Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047 
(2005); Charles Blazer, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 137 (2006); 
Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004); 
Richard Heeks, Understanding “Gold Farming” and Real-Money Trading as the Intersection of 
Real and Virtual Economies Virtual Economies, Virtual Goods and Service Delivery, J. VIRTUAL 
WORLDS RES. (Feb. 2010), http://journals.tdl.org/jvwr/index.php/jvwr/article/view/868/633;  
Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World Property Rights, MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 779 (2006); Ryan Vacca, Viewing Virtual Property Ownership Through the Lens of 
Innovation, 76 TENN. L. REV. 33 (2008). 
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author’s letters and unpublished novels17 may be of value today. 
But such assets may also be of what one might call dignitary or 
personal value. Millions of photos exist on Flickr, Picasa, etc., which 
are of very little value to anyone but the accountholder’s immediate 
friends and family—but to them they may be priceless. Similarly, 
access to the e-mails of a deceased family member may be of utmost 
importance to the bereaved, and this issue more than any has sparked 
public and legislative attention to the subject of digital assets, 
intermediary platforms and death.18 Another crucial modern 
phenomenon is the trend towards “memorialisation” of social network 
profiles on Facebook and the like;19 effectively turning them into 
shrines to the memory of the deceased, where friends leave last 
messages and other friends gather to read them.20 In such cases, 
although money is not (usually) the issue, emotions can run very high 
and conflicts develop: Do the friends or the parents decide if the profile 
is memorialised? What if the profile tells people something about the 
deceased the parents would rather suppress (e.g., homosexuality, 
atheism, suicide)? The increasing relevance of issues such as these has 
started to reach the courts: the first litigation relating to access to, and 
possession of, social network profiles is also beginning to percolate 
through.21 
II. DIGITAL INTERMEDIARIES: REGULATION OF POST-MORTEM PRIVACY 
BY CONTRACT 
Crucially, many important digital assets are controlled, both 
 
17 See, e.g., Kirschbaum, supra note 3; see also Charlotte Bronte Letters Sell for $296,000, MSN 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://news.msn.com/pop-culture/charlotte-bronte-letters-sell-for-
dollar296000-2 (reporting the sale of six letters written by Charlotte Bronte for nearly $300,000 
and the sale of a her previously unpublished novel for $1.1 million in 2011). 
18 See supra Scenario 1; see also infra Parts III and IV. 
19 See supra Scenario 3. “Memorialisation” usually involves freezing all posts at time of death, 
preventing adding of any new Friends and rejecting further login attempts, but allowing existing 
Friends of the deceased to add comments. See, e.g., Elaine Kasket, Continuing Bonds in the Age 
of Social Networking, 31(2) BEREAVEMENT CARE 62 (2012); Patrick Stokes, Ghosts in the 
Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook?, 25 PHIL. & TECH. 363 (2012).   
20 See Carroll & Landry, supra note 6, at 341–49; Kimberly Hieftje, The Role of Social 
Networking Sites in Memorialization of College Students, in DYING, DEATH AND GRIEF IN AN 
ONLINE UNIVERSE, supra note 6, at 31–46. 
21 See, e.g., in re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 
923 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Puff, supra note 4 (discussing a Brazilian case involving 
the Facebook page of a deceased girl). See also Nebraska is Latest State to Address Digital 
Legacy, DEATHANDDIGITALLEGACY.COM, (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.deathanddigitallegacy
.com/2012/02/20/nebraska-is-latest-state-to-address-digital-legacy/ (discussing the Janna Moore 
Morin case involving a conflict between family and friends over whether Facebook page should 
be deleted or memorialised); Video: Interview With the Family of Janna Moore Morin, Living 
Online After Death Faces Nebraska Legal Battle, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2012), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16801154. See generally Mazzone, supra note 8. Note that death 
is likely not to be the only occasion when control of digital assets will come into dispute: divorce 
and bankruptcy are two other obvious times of conflict. 
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practically and legally, by digital intermediaries—companies such as 
Google, Facebook, eBay, Twitter, Flickr, Vimeo, Tumblr, Yahoo! Mail, 
Hotmail, Blizzard (World of Warcraft), etc. Some non-digital assets are 
also controlled by intermediaries in the offline world. For instance, 
sometimes access to a bank account is controlled by the bank when the 
bank user dies. However, the issue is much more prevalent in the online 
world. 
Access to Facebook profiles, for example, is entirely restricted to 
those in contractual relationships with Facebook. A user cannot set up a 
profile, nor read other profiles, without entering into a contract which 
empowers Facebook to prescribe user conduct on their platform and, 
inter alia, allocate themselves a non-exclusive license to any works 
created on the platform.22 Such agreements—whether known as “end 
user license agreements” (“EULAs”)23; terms and conditions (“T&C”); 
or Acceptable Use, User or Privacy Policies—are all basically legal 
contracts. In normal adhesion-contract style, a user is typically deemed, 
at least in common law systems, to have read and accepted the terms 
and conditions set by Facebook (or another platform) by indicating 
acceptance (e.g., clicking an “I accept” button). This remains true even 
though research shows that most users either do not read or do not 
understand the privacy policies and do not have any effective ability 
either to renegotiate the terms or, in many cases, to go to a competitor 
platform due to the operation of network effect within an oligopolistic 
market.24 
When a Facebook user dies, even though their subscriber contract 
terminates, control of, and access to, the profile remains in the hands of 
Facebook. Facebook alone has the technical means to close, delete or 
memorialise the profile, according to its own internal rules or norms, 
while the heirs of the deceased may not even be able to read the profile 
if they are not Facebook users, or even if they are, if they were not 
“Friends” with the deceased (and how many young people have their 
mother, say, as a “Friend” on Facebook?).25 For Facebook users then, 
control over, and ownership of, the digital assets they create on the 
Facebook platform—posts, photos, tags, “likes”—is thus primarily 
regulated by contract. Intermediary contracts often do not contain any 
explicit rules on what happens to assets stored or created on their 
platforms upon death. Facebook does give some insight into their 
 
22 See infra note 65. 
23 EULAs are common in game and virtual worlds.  
24 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Law, Code and Social 
Networking Sites, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET (Brown ed., 
2013). 
25 For some amusing commentary from young people regarding parental Facebook use, see OH 
CRAP. MY PARENTS JOINED FACEBOOK, http://myparentsjoinedfacebook.tumblr.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
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internal rules,26 but many service provider contracts are simply blank on 
the matter of death and succession,27 which may mean disputes are left 
to the discretion of abuse teams, or the like. Even where rules do exist 
though, there is a patent potential for conflict on death between the rules 
of contract and the rules of succession/executry, as well as between the 
wishes of the deceased and the wishes of the survivors. This major 
problem was first explored judicially in the celebrated case in re 
Ellsworth.28 
In the landmark Ellsworth case, Yahoo!, a webmail provider, 
initially refused to give the surviving family of a U.S. marine who was 
killed in action the log-in rights to his e-mail account.29 They pled that 
their terms of service (i.e. the subscriber contract) forbade transfer of 
details to third parties on death, and which Yahoo! claimed were 
designed to protect the privacy of the account owner.30 The family 
argued that as his heirs, they should be able to see his e-mails—his “last 
words”—and sought access not only to those e-mails sent to them, but 
also to those sent by the deceased to others, and to those sent by others 
to the deceased. There was a serious imminent danger that the e-mails 
would be lost forever if Yahoo!, according to its non-survivorship 
policy, deleted the account. The judge, in a judgment of Solomon, 
allowed Yahoo! to abide by its privacy policy, in that the judge did not 
order transfer of log-in and password information, but rather, ordered 
Yahoo! to enable access to the deceased’s account by providing the 
family with a CD containing copies of the e-mails in the account. 
Yahoo!, it seems, also provided a paper copy.31 
Most of the copious commentary on the Yahoo! case, both 
journalistic and academic,32 has assumed a priori that the family had 
 
26 See infra Figure 1.  
27 Laurence Eastham, Funeral Music, SOC’Y FOR COMPUTERS & LAW BLOG (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=bp24899 (noting that the iTunes contract’s only mention of death 
is in relation to exclusion of liability). 
28 In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005). 
29 Id.; see also Tresa Baldas, Slain Soldier’s E-mail Spurs Legal Debate: Ownership of 
Deceased’s Messages at Crux of Issue, 27 NAT’L L.J. 10, 10 (2005). 
30 The terms read:  
No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree that your Yahoo account 
is non-transferable and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account 
terminate upon your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your account 
may be terminated and all contents therein permanently deleted.  
Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/terms/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2013). 
31 See Soldier’s Kin to Get Access to His Emails, JUSTINELLSWORTH.NET (Apr. 21, 2005), 
http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/ap-apr05.htm. Note that there seemed to be at least initial 
dubiety that Yahoo! had in fact transferred all e-mails in the account on to the CD. Id. 
32 See, e.g., Jonathan Darrow & Gerald Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails: Inheritable 
Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 308 (2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698907; Justin Atwater, Who Owns Email? Do You Have 
the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397; 
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natural justice on their side and that the court was right to find a way to 
grant their wishes. Relatively few writers have considered that the 
privacy interests of the deceased might not be co-existent with the 
desires of the surviving family in all cases, might not align with the 
interests of all members of that family, or might not be known at all, 
necessitating further investigation before disclosure of confidential 
material. In Scenario 1 above, we altered the facts of Ellsworth to have 
the dead marine engaged in a covert same-sex affair whose revelation 
might have a negative impact, both for the reputation of the dead and 
the welfare of the living. Alternatively, the marine might have been 
hiding an admission of cowardice under fire, a child born to a person 
other than his partner or beliefs invidious to the religious beliefs of 
some of his family or friends. We all say things in e-mail that we do not 
want, or plan for, certain individuals to ever read. Were the Yahoo! 
privacy policy drafters wrong in assuming that a subscriber to their 
webmail service would presumably choose not to have their e-mails 
passed on after death without express pre-mortem consent? Is it correct 
instead to assume, as some U.S. states already seem to have,33 that heirs 
or family should naturally take a right to the e-mails and other digital 
assets of a deceased just as they do to traditional assets forming part of 
the deceased’s estate? 
Such scenarios raise a number of key problems both practical and 
theoretical. First, are the e-mails and other digital assets left by a 
deceased to be regarded purely through the prism of property, or are 
they also seen as relevant to non-economic, personal-privacy or 
personality-interests? We discuss this in detail below at Part V. Second, 
who is seen as having the most effective right to control digital assets 
stored or conceived on intermediary platforms? On the one hand, 
traditional succession and executry law points to the family or heirs, and 
in the first instance, the executor or administrator who ingathers the 
estate on their behalf. On the other, in reality, technical control accrues 
to the intermediary, which has no obvious duties in law to the family or 
heirs, under either contract or confidence, other than those that are 
imposed by court order ex post facto. In particular it seems unlikely that 
an intermediary such as Facebook would be regarded as owing fiduciary 
 
Mazzone, supra note 8; John Connor, Digital Life After Death: The Issue of Planning for a 
Person’s Digital Assets After Death (Texas Tech Law School Research Paper No. 2011-02, Dec. 
1, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811044.  
33 Five states have already adopted laws mandating disclosure of e-mails and similar 
communications to administrators of deceased’s estates: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-334a; IND. CODE 
§ 29-1-13-1.1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 33-27; OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 269; IDAHO STAT. § 15-3-715(28) 
and § 15-5-424(3)(z). Eighteen were considering enacting similar pieces of legislation as of 
February 2013. See, e.g., Jim Lamm, February 2013 List of State Laws and Proposals Regarding 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or After Death (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.digitalpassing.com/2013/02/13/list-state-laws-proposals-fiduciary-access-digital-
property-incapacity-death/. 
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duties to heirs, as an executor or trustee would. In practice, the 
discretionary attitude34 many platforms take with issues of post-mortem 
data curation, preservation and access to digital assets to heirs after 
death often smacks more of effective internal management mixed with 
public relations than the kind of attitude expected of a conventional 
asset repository such as a bank. 
Thirdly and connectedly, what occurs if the “rules” of the 
intermediary, by contract or internal governance norms, conflict with 
the general law which may guarantee rights as to post-mortem privacy, 
or distribution of digital assets after death (e.g., copyright, succession, 
publicity rights)? Such cases raise patent difficulties.35 For example, 
Facebook’s memorialisation request form prescribes an order of priority 
of relatives making a request for memorialisation36 that does not 
correspond to the order of priority of heirs in intestacy in Scots law37 
(and, no doubt, in many other legal systems). Indeed, no one system 
could match the law in every jurisdiction where Facebook has 
subscribers, yet Facebook purports to apply one set of rules to every 
jurisdiction where it operates.38 While the judgment or “law” of 
intermediaries can be challenged—as in the Ellsworth case itself—such 
litigation is, and is likely to remain, exceptional, especially in legal 
systems outside the United States where consumer litigation is unusual 
and expensive, and often unaided by class actions or contingency fees, 
and where civil legal aid is increasingly sparse.39 For social networks, 
another element restricting challenge is that current users of the network 
may not wish to antagonise the “management” by pursuing litigation 
against them. For many young adults, expulsion from Facebook is, after 
all, akin to social death.40 Another important point is that interpretation 
of the language of the subscriber contract, unless challenged in court, is 
likely to fall to IT workers or administrators in abuse teams41 or human 
 
34 See infra Part IV. 
35 We leave aside here the matter of jurisdiction and choice of law, which in many cases 
concerning digital assets may further complicate the picture.  
36 See infra Figure 1.  
37 See Succession (Scotland) Act 1964. 
38 Note the effect of the Canadian Privacy Commissioner Facebook decision, discussed infra note 
50, which effectively forced Facebook to make changes to its technical code and contractual 
conditions worldwide. 
39 But see cases cited supra note 21 (relating to access to, and possession of, social network 
profiles upon death). 
40 See, e.g., Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick, Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens’ 
Attitudes, Practices and Strategies (Sept. 22, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1925128 (presented at Oxford Internet Institute’s A Decade in Internet Time: 
Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society); Danah Boyd, Facebook and “Radical 
Transparency,” APOPHENIA (May 14, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/
05/14/facebook-and-radical-transparency-a-rant.html. 
41 Abuse teams are employed by many ISPs and hosting sites, such as social networks, to deal 
with user reports of the abuse of the platform or service (e.g., its use for libel, upload of obscene 
materials or harassment). As a result, they often become de facto the first arbiters of how terms of 
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resources departments—not to trained lawyers who might read in 
exceptions or principles informing the exercise of discretion from 
general law or norms. Writers are divided as to whether even an 
executry court order, if obtained, would take precedence over the 
contractual rules of the platform.42 The issue is crucial, since in some 
jurisdictions, accessing an account contrary to the terms of service may 
be seen as unauthorised access,43 hacking or a similar crime.44 
Intermediaries themselves face difficult choices in deciding 
whether to accede to the wishes of family and heirs relating to post-
mortem privacy and assets or whether to respect the privacy of the 
deceased subscriber. In the United States, the 1986 Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act has recently been interpreted as 
preventing a service provider from disclosing stored communications 
unless a court order is made, even to heirs in a post-mortem scenario.45 
Our Scenario 3 references recent case law on this matter. On December 
20, 2008, Sahar Daftary died after falling from the twelfth floor of an 
apartment building located in Manchester, England. Members of her 
family disputed that Sahar had committed suicide, and believed that her 
Facebook account contained critical evidence showing her actual state 
of mind in the days leading up to her death. Facebook, however, refused 
to grant access to the account to the family without court authorisation, 
so the family initiated a request to subpoena the records in the 
California courts.46 The court found that the U.S. Stored 
Communications Act47 prevented a U.S. service provider from 
disclosing stored communications in civil proceedings. Interestingly, the 
court based its judgment explicitly on the privacy protection provided 
 
service, especially “acceptable use policies” may be interpreted. See Abuse Teams, ENISA, 
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/cert/background/coop/terms-definitions-1/other-
teams/abuse-teams (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
42 Compare Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 8, at 312 (asserting that digital assets should generally 
fall into the “gross estate” of a deceased, and therefore be considered “probate assets that [are] 
subject to the same inheritability rules as other probate assets,” but not really attacking head-on 
the difficulties of a conflict between terms of service and court orders), with Jim Lamm, Planning 
Ahead for Access to Contents of a Decedent’s Online Accounts, DIGITAL PASSING BLOG (Feb. 9, 
2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2012/02/09/planning-ahead-access-contents-decedent-
online-accounts/ (taking the view that even where an executor has the authority of the court to 
access the deceased’s assets, he still may not be authorised to access said assets if contrary to 
platform rules). 
43 Compare the Computer Misuse Act 1990, c. 18, § 1 (U.K.), with the Wire and Electronic 
Comm. Interception and Interception of Oral Comm. Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012) (criminalizing intentional unauthorized access of computers 
under certain circumstances). 
45 See In re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 
F. Supp. 2d 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (granting motion to quash); see also Ada Kulesza, What 
Happens to Your Facebook Account When You Die?, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://blogs.lawyers.com/2012/02/what-happens-to-facebook-account-when-you-die/. 
46 Facebook is based in California.  
47 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
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by this Act.48 In so doing, the court held that the interests protected by 
the U.S. statute extended to a foreign citizen, as much as to a U.S. 
citizen.49 The court, interestingly, refused to rule on whether Facebook 
could legitimately disclose the records to the family voluntarily, leaving 
both the social network and the family in an unfortunate state of 
uncertainty. 
III. PRACTICE AND “LAW” OF DIGITAL INTERMEDIARIES CONCERNING 
POST-MORTEM PRIVACY 
This brings us to considering the actual practices of important 
online intermediaries in the digital assets world. What is immediately 
noticeable is that there is no single model of good practice as to post-
mortem privacy, or, indeed, post-mortem property. Instead, for 
consumers there is a confusing jungle of difficult to understand terms 
and conditions. Facebook, in many ways the industry gold standard,50 
offers users the option of having their profile deleted51 or memorialised 
after death,52 as well as the opportunity to provide a download of the 
deceased’s account if prior consent has been given by the deceased, or if 
 
48 In re Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 F. 
Supp. 2d 1204, 1205–06  (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Having reviewed the papers and considered 
the arguments of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Facebook’s motion to quash is 
GRANTED. The case law confirms that civil subpoenas may not compel production of records 
from providers like Facebook. To rule otherwise would run afoul of the ‘specific [privacy] 
interests that the [SCA] seeks to protect.’” (citing Theofel v. Farley-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1074 
(9th Cir. 2004)). 
49 Id. 
50 Facebook’s procedures for deletion and memorialisation of deceased’s accounts were 
improved globally partly as a result of a general intervention by the Canadian Privacy 
Commissioner, adjudicating on formal complaints made. As a result, memorialisation now 
involves taking the profile out of public search results and preventing further login attempts (e.g., 
by scammers or persons with whom the deceased had shared the password). See Facebook Agrees 
to Address Privacy Commissioner’s Concerns, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R OF CAN. (Aug. 
27, 2009), http://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2009/nr-c_090827_e.asp. 
51 The relevant section reads:  
We will process certain special requests for verified immediate family members, 
including requests to remove a loved one’s account. This will completely remove the 
timeline and all associated content from Facebook, so no one can view it. For all 
special requests, we require verification that you are an immediate family member or 
executor. Requests will not be processed if we are unable to verify your relationship to 
the deceased. Examples of documentation that we will accept include: 
The deceased’s birth certificate. 
The deceased’s death certificate. 
Proof of authority under local law that you are the lawful representative of the 
deceased or his/her estate. 
FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/265593773453448/ (last visited Dec. 
28, 2012); see also Deactivating, Deleting & Memorializing Accounts: “How Do I Report a 
Deceased Person or an Account That Needs to be Memorialized?,” FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/help/359046244166395/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2013) (“In order to protect the 
privacy of the deceased person, we cannot provide login information for the account. However, 
once it has been memorialized, we take measures to secure the account.”). 
52 See infra Figure 1. 
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a court order is made after death, as in, most typically, probate or 
confirmation, but also possibly where law enforcement agencies 
become involved.53 Facebook, however, still refuses to provide heirs 
with the login and password information needed to access the account 
itself. Notably, this advice to heirs or family is not contained within the 
terms and conditions of the Facebook contract itself, but is rather found 
in the “Help” section, and therefore is arguably a statement of good 
practice that is not binding on Facebook or enforceable by families or 
heirs. It is also somewhat difficult for non-legal users to find. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Facebook’s Memorialisation Request.54 
 
53 Facebook asserts:  
We take our responsibility to protect the privacy of people who use Facebook very 
seriously. We are only able to consider requests for account contents of a deceased 
person from an authorized representative. The application to obtain account content is 
a lengthy process and will require you to obtain a court order.  
Keep in mind, sending a request or filing the required documentation does not 
guarantee that we will be able to provide you with the content of the deceased person’s 
account.  
Deactivating, Deleting & Memorializing Accounts: How Do I Request Content from the Account 
of a Deceased Person?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/359046244166395/ (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2013); see also Carroll, supra note 14. 
54 FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/contact/?id=305593649477238 
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Facebook provides perhaps the most detailed intermediary code on 
post-mortem remedies. Twitter, by contrast, appears only to allow 
deactivation of the deceased users account, though some writers report 
they will also authorise the download of all of a deceased’s tweets.55 
Like Facebook, they explicitly exclude the possibility of providing login 
information to heirs to access the account of the deceased, leaving only 
discretionary possibilities of access to the content.56 
Similarly, as we have seen, Yahoo! (whose policies are also shared 
by Flickr) also refuses to pass on logins and passwords needed to access 
accounts to heirs.57 Google likewise appears only to contemplate 
passing on the contents of a Gmail account to the deceased’s heirs, 
rather than passing on login details, and even then the contents will only 
be given to the heirs in exceptional circumstances.58 Microsoft Hotmail, 
on the other hand, appears willing to offer access to the administrators 
of estates of incapax, but not deceased, users.59 Thus, among webmail 
providers and social networks, a norm seems to be emerging of 
allowing discretionary access to content in the accounts of deceased 
users, but no formal right to such content, and express prohibition of the 
transfer of account login details. Notably, transfer of account login 
details would allow family or friends to carry on activities such as 
posting new content on the site or adding new friends. 
Another key contractual area relevant to post-mortem rights, of 
particular importance in online games or virtual worlds prominently 
featuring User Generated Content (“UGC”), is the ownership of assets 
 
(last visited Dec. 28 2012). 
55 See, e.g., Wendy Moncur, Digital Ownership Across Lifespans, in IUAES Commission on 
Ageing and the Aged (Chirara Garratini & David Prendergast eds., Bergahn Books forthcoming 
2013). 
56 Twitter’s policy provides: 
In the event of the death of a Twitter user, we can work with a person authorized to act 
on the behalf of the estate or with a verified immediate family member of the deceased 
to have an account deactivated. . . . Please note: We are unable to provide login 
information for the account to anyone regardless of his or her relationship to the 
deceased. 
Help Center: Contacting Twitter About a Deceased User, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com
/groups/33-report-abuse-or-policy-violations/topics/148-policy-information/articles/87894-how-
to-contact-twitter-about-a-deceased-user (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
57 See supra Part III; Yahoo! Terms of Service, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/uk/yahoo/utos/en-gb/ 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2013); in re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005). 
58 With regard to getting access to a deceased’s Gmail account, Google’s Terms of Service 
provide:  
We extend our condolences for your loss. If you need access to the Gmail account 
content of an individual who has passed away, in rare cases we may be able to provide 
the contents of the Gmail account to an authorized representative of the deceased 
person.  
Account Access Issues: Accessing a Deceased Person’s Mail, GOOGLE, https://support.google
.com/mail/answer/14300?hl=en (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
59 See Mazzone, supra note 8, at 1664 n.98. 
Edwards-Galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/22/13  1:51 PM 
98 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 32:83 
created in these games or via these platforms. As noted above, these 
assets often have considerable value in the “real world” as well as 
sentimental value. Blizzard, the World of Warcraft provider, explicitly 
excludes any property rights of users in assets created or traded in the 
game and forbids transfers of accounts.60 By contrast, Linden Lab, 
provider of the virtual world Second Life, gives users relatively 
extensive rights in content created by users therein.61 Mazzone notes 
that in line with these policies, Linden Lab also allows for in-game 
assets to be transferred and bequeathed on death.62 Looking beyond 
virtual worlds, Instagram, a photo-sharing site recently bought by 
Facebook, caused Internet protests when, in December 2012, it 
appeared to change its terms of service to acquire ownership of all user 
photos stored on the site. Fairly swiftly, the change was reversed.63 In 
 
60 Blizzard’s terms regarding “Ownership” read: 
All rights and title in and to the Service (including without limitation any user 
accounts, titles, computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories, 
dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, sounds, musical 
compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral rights, any related 
documentation, “applets,” transcripts of the chat rooms, character profile information, 
recordings of games) are owned by Blizzard or its licensors.  
World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement, BLIZZARD ENTM’T, http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/
company/legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2012). The terms regarding 
“Ownership/Selling of the Account or Virtual Items” read:  
Blizzard does not recognize the transfer of World of Warcraft Accounts or BNET 
Accounts (each an “Account”). You may not purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, 
or offer to purchase, sell, gift or trade any Account, and any such attempt shall be null 
and void. Blizzard owns, has licensed, or otherwise has rights to all of the content that 
appears in the Game. You agree that you have no right or title in or to any such 
content, including without limitation the virtual goods or currency appearing or 
originating in the Game, or any other attributes associated with any Account. Blizzard 
does not recognize any purported transfers of virtual property executed outside of the 
Game, or the purported sale, gift or trade in the “real world” of anything that appears or 
originates in the Game. Accordingly, you may not sell in-game items or currency for 
“real” money, or exchange those items or currency for value outside of the Game. 
Id. 
61 Specifically, users retain the title to all intellectual property brought into the game, maintain the 
right to delete all copies of their content from the game, and most importantly, retain full rights in 
the content they create. See Linden Lab Terms of Service: 2.1 Linden Lab Owns Intellectual 
Property Rights in the Service and the Linden Marks, LINDEN LAB, http://lindenlab.com/tos (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2013) (“You acknowledge and agree that Linden Lab and its’ licensors own all 
right, title, and interest in and to the Service, including all Intellectual Property Rights therein, 
other than with respect to User Content.”) (emphasis added); see also Vacca, supra note 16; 
Alisa B. Steinberg, For Sale—One Level 5 Barbarian for 94,800 Won: The International Effects 
of Virtual Property and the Legality of Its Ownership, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381 (2009); 
Jennifer Gong, Defining and Addressing Virtual Property in International Treaties, 17 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 101 (2011). 
62 Mazzone, supra note 8 (citing Linden Lab Official: Death and Other Worries Outside Second 
Life, SECOND LIFE WIKI, http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Linden_Lab_Official:Death_and_other_
worries_outside_Second_Life).  
63 In any event, the actual legal significance and implications of the change were disputed. See 
Amanda Holpuch, Instagram Reassures Users Over Terms of Service After Massive Outcry, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/18/
instagram-issues-statement-terms-of-service.  
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fact, Instagram’s provisions on ownership64 now, unsurprisingly, very 
closely resemble Facebook’s65 in that they require the user to grant a 
non-exclusive, royalty-free license over any content hosted or posted on 
the service. In practice it is understood that this non-exclusive license is 
mainly used so that on-site profiles can be displayed in marketing. It is 
easy to imagine that the privacy interests of a deceased and their 
surviving family might well be invaded if Facebook, say, used a picture 
of the deceased smiling happily in their corporate marketing materials. 
Interestingly, Google, which operates many services allowing the 
submission of original content (e.g., homemade videos on YouTube, 
blogs on Blogger, texts stored on Google Drive), explicitly and very 
plainly disclaims any rights in the intellectual property therein.66 
Most importantly for this Article, until very recently none of the 
major social media or hosting platforms offered an easy way for users to 
express, on the site, in advance of death, their preferences as to what 
would happen to their digital assets, and by extension, private facts 
about their life, after they died. Being able to clearly indicate such 
wishes on the site, and have them respected, is clearly a preferable 
solution to the problems of post-mortem privacy. Lacking such a 
facility, a user has few other effective choices. They can trust their 
wishes to a will, which as discussed above and in Scenario 0, might or 
might not be given effect by the intermediary, and may invoke 
executor/platform conflicts. Furthermore, in most countries, rates of 
intestacy are high, particularly amongst the young, who are not prone to 
facing up to mortality and making a will.67 They can use one of the new 
 
64 See Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/# (last updated Jan. 19, 
2013) (“Instagram does not claim ownership of any Content that you post on or through the 
Service. Instead, you hereby grant to Instagram a non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, 
transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide license to use the Content that you post on or through the 
Service . . . .”). Interestingly, though, Instragram’s post-Facebook merger policy on deceased 
users remains extremely vague by comparison to Facebook’s. See Privacy Policy, Rule 8, 
INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/#section8 (last updated Jan.19, 2013).  
65 Facebook’s terms read:  
[Y]ou grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide 
license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP 
License). This IP License ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless 
your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it . . . . 
Statement Of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last 
updated Dec. 11, 2012). 
66 See Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last updated 
March 1, 2012) (“Your content in our services. Some of our Services allow you to submit content. 
You retain ownership of any intellectual property rights that you hold in that content. In short, 
what belongs to you stays yours.”) (emphasis added). Note that the YouTube terms of service 
modify this to require the user to grant a license to YouTube. See Terms of Service, Sec. 8, 
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms (last updated June 9, 2010).  
67 For example, nearly 60% of adults in England and Wales have not made a will. See Joe 
Thornhill, Die Intestate and Your Loved Ones Will Be Left to Untangle Your Legacy, 
MAILONLINE (July 28, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/pensions/article-
2180242/Die-intestate-loved-ones-left-untangle-legacy.html. 
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breeds of “digital will” online services, such as Legacy Locker, but in 
effect these face the same problems as an actual will, but without the 
benefit of legal or platform advice. Users would, one imagines, be much 
more likely to use an on-site facility, which could be as easy to use as 
clicking on other site settings; moreover, users could then reasonably 
expect the platform to conform to their wishes, if perhaps still not those 
of their families or heirs. We have argued in previous work that just as 
social media sites now generally provide users with privacy preference 
tools during life, albeit grudgingly and inconstantly, they should also 
provide them with tools to pre-assign what happens to their personal 
data when they die.68 Until now, however, there was little sign of such a 
practice emerging, with strong, though unproveable suspicion, that most 
social networks, curating an environment designed for fun and 
entertainment, would rather (ahem) bury any mention of death rather 
than forefront it. 
In a radical move forward, however, in April 2013, Google (whose 
empire includes not just their search engine but also Gmail, Blogger, 
Picasa and many other host sites for digital assets) introduced the 
Orwellian sounding “Inactive Account Manager,”69 which allows users 
to prescribe which of a number of data disposal methods they wish to be 
pursued after a prescribed length of inactivity (say, one, three or nine 
months). As Google provides: 
You might want your data to be shared with a trusted friend or 
family member, or, you might want your account to be deleted 
entirely. There are many situations that might prevent you from 
accessing or using your Google account. Whatever the reason, we 
give you the option of deciding what happens to your data.70 
It will be interesting to see if the other major players follow Google’s 
precedent. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the range of stakeholders involved 
in post-mortem privacy and digital assets cases is by no means limited 
to platforms, heirs and those in a contractual relationship with service 
providers.71 Society in general, as well as specific heirs, family and 
friends, have an interest in the legacy of the dead; for example, authors’ 
letters (or e-mails, or blogs) have value to historians, scholars and critics 
as well as a market value to collectors. McCallig argues interestingly 
that in the past, copyright acted as a surrogate for post-mortem privacy 
 
68 Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 8. 
69 See Andreas Tuerk, Plan Your Digital Afterlife with Inactive Account Manager, GOOGLE PUBLIC 
POLICY BLOG (Apr. 11, 2013), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/plan-your-
digital-afterlife-with.html.  
70 See GOOGLE INACTIVE ACCOUNT MANAGER, https://www.google.com/settings/u/0/account/
inactive (last visited Apr. 29, 2013). 
71 See Desai, supra note 8.  
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in such situations by providing that unpublished copyright writings 
(such as letters or nowadays, arguably, Friends-locked social media 
profiles) were transferable on death only by express written inter vivos 
instructions.72 In modern copyright law, however, at least in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and the United States, such restrictions have, on the 
whole, disappeared, and unpublished copyright texts will, like other 
assets in the deceased’s estate, transfer automatically to heirs unless 
deliberately destroyed before death (a process that would have been 
plausible for hard copy texts (or audio tapes, or recorded video) but is 
extremely hard to guarantee for digital texts in a world of remote, 
networked, mirrored and archived storage).  We discuss the place of the 
public interest in assessing the case for post-mortem privacy, below in 
Part VI. 
IV. REGULATION OF POST-MORTEM PRIVACY OTHER THAN BY 
CONTRACT 
Privacy is often perceived amongst academics as a subset of a 
general group of rights seen as personal to the deceased, and so named 
“personality rights.”73 As usefully summarised by Whitty and 
Zimmermann, personality rights may cover at least the following 
categories of interests: life, bodily integrity, personal security, physical 
liberty, reputation, dignity, privacy, identity (image), moral rights to 
copyright, autonomy, family relationships and rights of deceased’s 
relatives.74 These categories protect not only the personal attributes of 
individuals, but often also the economic or patrimonial, as most 
noticeably in the context of the commercial exploitation of celebrity 
image rights, and are conceived of very differently in common and civil 
law systems.75 Post-mortem privacy rights will be explored here through 
the general law around personality rights, in particular focusing on: 
civilian “personality rights,” common law “publicity rights” and privacy 
torts; defamation; and the moral rights of authors (it is tempting, though 
provocative, to suspect that a better new term of art to invent than “post-
mortem privacy” might indeed be “post-mortem personality”). This 
 
72 McCallig, supra note 1. 
73 From an enormous literature, useful comparative texts on personality rights include: NIAL 
WHITTY & REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY IN SCOTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (2009); HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH, ANSGAR OHLY & AGNES LUCAS-SCHLOETTER, 
PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL 
APPROPRIATION (2005); HUW BEVERLEY-SMITH, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF 
PERSONALITY (2002); GILLIAN BLACK, PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND IMAGE: EXPLOITATION AND 
LEGAL CONTROL (2011); GERT BRUGGEMHEIER, AURELIA C. CIACCI & PATRICK 
O’CALLAGHAN, PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW (2010); J. NEETHLING, J.M. 
POTGIETER & P.J. VISSER, NEETHLING’S LAW OF PERSONALITY (1996); CEES VAN DAM, 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW (2007). 
74 Whitty & Zimmerman, supra note 73, at 3, 165. 
75 See id. at 310–11. 
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Article will approach this issue comparatively, looking at key civilian 
and common law jurisdictions with regard to their treatment of post-
mortem privacy. 
A. Personality, Privacy and Persona Post-Mortem Rights 
1. Common Law 
In the English, U.S., and other common law systems, the reigning 
principle has traditionally been actio personalis moritur cum persona, 
meaning personal causes of action die with the person, (e.g., defamation 
claims, breach of confidence claims, wrongful dismissal claims, etc.).76 
Although this principle has been whittled away at in many contexts for 
reasons of social policy such as the need to succour to the dependents of 
the deceased,77 Beverley-Smith, perhaps the leading English writer on 
commercial image rights, still represents a prevailing sentiment in 
noting that, “reputation and injured dignity are generally of no concern 
to a deceased person.”78 By contrast, economic claims traditionally 
survive death in common law and pass to the heirs in testacy or 
intestacy. Indeed, the widest and most accepted definition of property 
(as opposed to personal right) is that which survives and transmits on 
the death of the proprietor. Reflecting this emphasis on economic rights, 
the term “personality rights” is itself not recognised as a term of art in 
common law;79 rather, specific torts and causes of action are used to 
protect certain aspects of personality, including, in various countries, 
breach of confidence, false endorsement, passing off, malicious 
falsehood, appropriation of personality, trespass and nuisance.80 Most 
notably, the English courts continue to deny that a distinct tort of 
invasion of privacy exists81 and have no separate category of publicity 
or image rights as in the U.S.,82 although the gap has to some extent 
been taken up by the development of various torts, including breach of 
 
76 See Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.).  
77 The principle has been revised in the United Kingdom and now only pertains to causes of 
action for defamation and certain claims for bereavement. See generally Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, c. 41 (U.K.), The Race Relations Act 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), 
Sex Discrimination Act 1975, c. 65 (U.K.), Disability Discrimination Act 1995, c. 50 (U.K.) and 
Administration of Justice Act 1982, c. 53 (U.K.). 
78 BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 73, at 124. 
79 Indeed, Jones and Wilson in 2007 reported fears that personality rights were “Continental 
psychobabble.” Victoria Jones & Alastair Wilson, Photographs, Privacy and Public Places, 29 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. J. 357, 358 (2007). See also Hazel Carty, ch. 7, in WHITTY AND 
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 73, at 400 (“Despite all of the above developments, there are still no 
concrete ‘personality rights’ in English law.”). 
80 See BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 73 passim; BLACK, supra note 73, Part I; BRUGGEMEIER, 
supra note 73, at 25–28.  
81 See Raymond Wacks, Why There Will Never Be an English Common Law Privacy Tort, in 
NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 154–
83 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006).  
82 See infra.  
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confidence, libel, passing off as “false endorsement”83 and unfair 
competition.84 Nevertheless, many European authors currently argue 
that the common law is beginning to take protection of personality 
rights more seriously in a way more akin to civilian countries, partly 
due to the obligations imposed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights (“ECHR”), which are promoting the growth of a harmonised 
European law of public fundamental rights.85 In particular, judicial 
activism since the incorporation of the ECHR into U.K. law via the 
Human Rights Act of 1998 has led to the effective development of an 
English tort of privacy86 via the vehicle of the tort of breach of 
confidence.87 Similarly, as the importance and commercial value of 
image rights has grown, the U.K. courts have made considerable 
progress in finding remedies for unauthorised use of images via notions 
of passing off;88 however, as Black points out, these still contain a gap 
in not providing a celebrity or other person (i.e., an assignee) with a 
positive right to exploit rather than merely the negative right to prevent 
unauthorised persons from exploiting their image.89 Judicial 
developments have not, however, gone so far as to develop a surrogate 
publicity right which is transmissible on death. Indeed, where attempts 
were made to find such a remedy via trademark law, the English courts 
established a clear precedent that the name, image or “personality” of a 
dead celebrity (such as Princess Diana or Elvis Presley) cannot be 
protected by trademark, simply because diverse goods and services 
bearing that likeness or name are sold without authorisation of the 
estate.90 
2. Civilian Systems 
By contrast, many states whose legal system derives partly or 
wholly from civilian tradition have historically been more inclined to 
recognise both the principled existence of personality rights, and their 
persistence after death, for reasons related to the historical respect for 
notions of liberty, dignity and reputation, especially of creators. In such 
a tradition, the main driver of respect for personality rights is arguably 
 
83 See Irvine v. TalkSport Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 423, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1576 (Eng.). 
84 See, e.g., Sim v. HJ Heinz, [1959] 1 WLR 313 (Eng.). 
85 BRUGGEMEIER, supra note 73, chs. 1–2; WHITTY AND ZIMMERMAN, supra note 73, at 479–99. 
86 This cause of action is not referred to as the “tort of privacy,” however—it is sometimes 
known as “misuse of private information.” See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 [31], 
[2004] 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
87 See Douglas v. Hello!, [2003] EWHC (Ch) 786, [2003] 3 All E.R. 996 (Eng.); Douglas v. 
Hello!, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595, [2006] Q.B. 125 (Eng.); Douglas v. Hello!, [2007] UKHL 21, 
[2006] Q.B. 125 (Eng.); Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22. 
88 See Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 423. 
89 BLACK, supra note 73, at 22. 
90 See Elvis Presley Enters. Inc. v. Sid Shaw Elvishly Yours, [1999] EWCA (Civ) 964; Diana, 
Princess of Wales Trade Mark, [2001] E.T.M.R. 25. 
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non-economic (though the two are of course inextricably intermixed) so 
the likelihood of transmission of the right on death is much greater than 
in common law. Nonetheless, there are significant differences even 
among the key civilian legal systems as to transmission of personality 
interests on death. For example, in Germany, the protection of human 
dignity derives from its highest constitutional source, Article 1 of the 
Basic Law,91 which has been applied to protect the honour of a deceased 
person. In the Mephisto92 and Marlene Dietrich93 cases, the German 
courts granted protection for both the non-commercial interests (dignity, 
privacy) and commercial interests of the deceased (the use of name, 
voice, or image for financial gain),94 noting: 
It would be inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of the 
inviolability of human dignity, which underlies all basic rights, if a 
person could be belittled and denigrated after his death. Accordingly 
an individual’s death does not put an end to the state’s duty under 
Art. 1 I GG to protect him from assaults on his human dignity.95 
However, in a different part of the civilian tradition, the French 
courts and legislature have taken a different position. For example, 
French law distinguishes between the economic and personal aspects of 
personality rights (a dualistic conception, as opposed to the German 
monistic position)96 and treats the latter as non-transmissible.97 In SA 
 
91 GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic 
Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.). 
92 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 24, 1971, 30, 173, 
translated in J. A. Weir, Institute for Transnational Law, Foreign Law Translations, UNIV. OF 
TEX. AT AUSTIN, SCH. OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work_new/german/case.php?id=1478 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
93 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 1, 1999, BGH 1 ZR 49/97, 
translated in Raymond Youngs, Institute for Transnational Law, Foreign Law Translations, 
UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, SCH. OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/
transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=726 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
94 The court stated: 
The components of the right of personality which are of financial value remain after 
the death of the holder of the right of personality, at any rate as long as the non-
material interests are still protected. The corresponding powers pass to the heir of the 
holder of the personality right and can be exercised by him in accordance with the 
express or presumed will of the deceased.  
Id. 
95 Weir, supra note 92, § 6. 
96 For a good summary of this distinction, see WHITTY AND ZIMMERMAN, supra note 73, ch. 1, 
¶¶ 3–4, 9. 
97 This distinction originates with Perreau, in his famous article on “Des droits de la 
personnalité,” published in 1909. The article delivered a taxonomy of personality rights in France, 
distinguishing between rights concerning the physical individual (life, limb and health, including 
consent to medical treatment) and those concerning the moral personality (honour, liberty and 
intellectual works—moral rights). The latter had effect erga omnes and could not be evaluated in 
monetary terms. They were thus inalienable, imprescriptible and non-inheritable. They could only 
be exercised and enforced by the “owner” herself. See WHITTY AND ZIMMERMAN, supra note 73, 
at 320.  
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Editions Plon v. Mitterand, the Court of Cassation held that “the right to 
act in respect of privacy disappears when the person in question, the 
sole holder of that right, dies.”98 Bruggemheier concludes therefore that 
“the right to one’s image is of a moral and pecuniary nature: the 
economic right which allows pecuniary gain from commercially 
exploiting the image is not purely personal and can be passed on to the 
heirs.”99 He notes that this partial post-mortem transmission of image 
rights also applies to non-public figures.100 
3. U.S. Law 
Although the United States is also a common law system, legal 
developments have taken a somewhat different turn than those in 
England. In the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the American Legal 
Institute takes a stance similar to English law that a person’s privacy 
interest ends upon his death.101 According to the Restatement, there can 
be no cause of action for invasion of privacy by (or on behalf) of a dead 
person, with the exception of “appropriation of one’s name or 
likeness.”102 As a result, some personality rights can, indeed, be 
protected after death either in common law or by statute, and are then 
known generally under the rubric of “publicity rights.” Although the 
exact content of these rights varies from state to state, since they are not 
harmonised at the federal level, it is fair to say that the U.S. conception 
of post-mortem transmission of publicity rights depends on the 
conception of these rights as property.103 The growth of publicity rights 
has been intimately connected to the growth of a market for the 
exploitation of celebrity images, a market that is almost entirely 
concerned with economic rather than privacy interests. The key 
question is not whether a celebrity’s privacy can be protected but rather 
who has the right to exploit it (or to sue someone for exploiting it 
without authorisation). Rights are most commonly exercised not by the 
 
98 SA Editions Plon v. Mitterand, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
May 27, 1997, JCP 1977, II, 22894 (Fr.) (citing December 14, 1999, Bull. Civ. 1, no. 345 (Fr.)), 
translated in Tony Weir, Institute for Transnational Law, Foreign Law Translations, UNIV. OF 
TEX. AT AUSTIN, SCH. OF LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/
work_new/french/case.php?id=1240 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
99 Id. 
100 BRUGGEMEIER, supra note 73, at 17. 
101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977) (“Except for the appropriation of one’s 
name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual 
whose privacy is invaded.”). 
102 Id. 
103 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (distinguishing the tort of 
invasion of privacy from infringement of a right of publicity by emphasising that the interest 
protected through a cause of action for a false light invasion of privacy was an interest in 
reputation, whereas the right of publicity protected the proprietary interest of the individual.). 
See Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).  
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person whose image is in question but by assignees whose business it is 
to commercially exploit images and who make very large amounts of 
money doing so.104 Some states have no version of a publicity right per 
se, but the right is statutory in nineteen states, and a further twenty-eight 
recognize the right via common law.105 
The first significant right of publicity case was the decision of the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Haelan Laboratories Inc v. Topps 
Chewing Gum Inc., where the issue was whether a chewing gum 
company could prevent the unauthorised use of the image of famous 
baseball players who had contractually endorsed that product, by a rival 
chewing gum company.106 The court did not explore, in much detail, the 
question of whether this right was of a proprietary nature, but rather 
took a common sense view that a man should have a right in the 
publicity value of his own photograph, stating: “whether it be labeled a 
‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 
‘property’ simply symbolises the fact that courts enforce a claim which 
has a pecuniary worth.”107 
Westfall and Landau have suggested that this initial vague 
theoretical and instrumentalist background meant there were no obvious 
parameters to guide the judicial or legislative development of the right 
of personality after Haelan, resulting in these rights being extended to 
ever-wider aspects of identity.108  It is unsurprising then that we find a 
patchwork development of post-mortem publicity rights too, across the 
various U.S. states. At common law, survival of the right of publicity on 
death has been recognised in Georgia, New Jersey, and in Tennessee; 
and by statute, in California, Indiana and other states. Hicks determined 
that, in total, sixteen states recognise a post-mortem right of publicity 
under statute or common law, while two states explicitly refuse to 
recognise a post-mortem right of publicity.109 
 
104 For example, CMG Worldwide (“CMG”) is an Indiana company, and licensing agent, that 
reaps between $12 and $20 million in annual revenue by representing Monroe, Babe Ruth, James 
Dean, and more than 250 other deceased celebrities. See Michael Decker, Goodbye, Norma Jean: 
Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Publicity’s Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 243, 245–46 (2009). In 2007, CMG earned more than $7 million from ventures using 
Monroe’s identity. Id. at 246. CMG’s Chief Executive Officer, Mark Roesler, claims to have been 
the “driving force” behind Indiana’s right of publicity statute, which he calls “the most 
progressive and celebrity-friendly worldwide.” As Decker states, “[a]ccording to The New York 
Times, Roesler’s fees begin at one-third of the profits; by comparison, a standard agent’s fee is 
ten percent.” Id. 
105 See Statutes, Right of publicity, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Sept. 17, 
2013). 
106 Halean Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
107 Id. at 868 (Frank, J.); see also BLACK, supra note 73, at 13; Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of 
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). 
108 David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 71 (2005). 
109 Aubrie Hicks, The Right to Publicity after Death: Post-Mortem Personality Rights in 
Washington in the Wake of Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
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The duration of the right of publicity after death also varies from 
state to state. For example, Florida recognises the right for forty years 
after death, Illinois for fifty years, California for seventy years and 
Indiana for one hundred years.110 Of those that have, a right of post-
mortem duration of between ten and one hundred years seems typical.111 
However, many jurisdictions have not yet considered the post-mortem 
issue. Given the overwhelmingly economic purposes underpinning the 
creation of publicity rights, most publicity rights originally benefited 
only celebrities, for whom image represented a serious revenue 
stream.112 However, several states, including Nevada, Illinois and 
Washington, have also extended post-mortem publicity rights to non-
celebrities.113 However, in those jurisdictions, lack of celebrity status 
generally has an impact on the post-mortem duration of publicity rights: 
for example, in Washington, personality rights for deceased non-
celebrities are only protected for a term of ten years after death, whereas 
celebrity reputations are protected for seventy-five years after death.114 
B. Defamation 
Defamation may plausibly be seen as just one of the subset of 
rights we gathered together under the rubric of personality rights. It has, 
however, some interesting features in relation to post-mortem privacy 
that make it worthy of attention. Defamation canonically can be 
distinguished from privacy torts in that it operates only where false 
statements or impressions have been published about a person’s 
reputation. As such, it operates in the hinterland between a pure persona 
right (reputation, dignity or honour) and a property right (akin to 
goodwill or brand). As noted above, common law jurisdictions have 
traditionally stated, as a matter of principle, that purely personal 
obligations “die with the person.”115 Although this principle has been 
attenuated in many common law jurisdictions, it still holds fast in 
 
275, 276 (2012). 
110 John E. Ottaviani & Allison A. Reuter, Maybe You Can Take it With You: Post-Mortem 
Rights of Publicity in the United States, WORLD TRADEMARK REV., 118–19 (Oct./Nov. 2012). 
111 Id. at 118. 
112 See Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking,  
44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 355 (2011) (noting that “[i]t was only in the last years of the twentieth 
century that judges repeatedly took pains to note the universal eligibility for the right of 
publicity.”).  
113 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (West 2011); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/10 
(West 1999); see infra note 114. Indeed, a literature is emerging that argues that if publicity rights 
are to exist they should apply equally to all, celebrities and non-celebrities, with a differentiation 
being made in the amount of damages payable for unauthorised appropriation of image, 
personality, etc. For an overview, see Mark Bartholomew, supra note 112.  
114 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 63.60.020, 63.60.040 (West 2013). 
115 See supra note 77. For a comparison between the U.S. and German perspectives, see Hannes 
Rösler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights—An Analysis of U.S. and German 
Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. OF INT’L L. 153, 153–05 (2008). 
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English law in relation to defamation. This has been confirmed very 
recently in the case of Harvey Smith v. Bobby Dha, where the court held 
that no ruling could be given in a defamation action where the claimant 
died while waiting for judgment to be handed down.116 Mrs. Justice 
Nicola Davies maintained: 
No one other than a claimant can give reliable evidence about his or 
her feelings or distress. No one other than a defendant—should a 
defendant die—can give reliable evidence to rebut a plea of malice. 
It cannot be right that some libel actions abate and others do not, 
depending on the arguments raised in them or the stage of 
proceedings.117 
It is interesting that although there is a brief reference to “the 
unsatisfactory nature of this principle,”118 this judgment seems mainly 
based on practical issues of procedure and evidence in any future 
appeal, rather than theoretical justifications that a right in libel as a 
persona interest should die with the claimant. 
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts also 
appears to be clear on the matter stating that: “One who publishes 
defamatory matter concerning a deceased person is not liable either to 
the estate of the person or to his descendants or relatives.”119 This is also 
supported by case law.120 However, many U.S. states have begun slowly 
to reject the concept that libel claims die with the victim.121 Some 
support has been garnered here from the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, which recognized that a person’s 
interest in protecting his reputation does not end upon his death.122 
Currently, however, Rhode Island is still the only U.S. state that 
provides a cause of action for defamation of the dead, and even then 
only in very limited circumstances,123 although some other states allow 
 
116 See Harvey Smith v. Bobby Dha, [2013] EWHC 838 (QB) (Eng.). 
117 Id. ¶ 13. 
118 Id. 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 560 (1977). 
120 See generally Raymond Iryami, Give the Dead Their Day in Court: Implying a Private Cause 
of Action for Defamation of the Dead from Criminal Libel Statutes, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1083, 1088 n.33 (1999). 
121 See generally Florence Frances Cameron, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the 
Antiquated “Acto Personalis” Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1985). 
122 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, stated that it is unreasonable to assume that a person’s interest in his 
reputation ends upon his death. Id. Justice Sandra D. O’Connor agreed in her dissenting 
judgment. See id. at 2086–89. See also Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for 
Amending the Visual Artists Rights Act to Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 
UMKC L. REV. 897 (2007). 
123 The defamation must be published as a part of an obituary or a similar notice within three 
months of death. The statute also imposes a one-year of limitation for the possible plaintiffs. R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 10-7.1-1 (1974)  
Edwards-Galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/22/13  1:51 PM 
2013] PROTECTING POST-MORTEM PRIVACY 109 
the suits to survive where a plaintiff dies while the suit is pending.124 
Interestingly, in both common law and civilian tradition, 
defamation is often still subject to criminal prosecution as well as civil 
action. Orsi notes as a peculiarity of U.S. state laws, given the general 
extinction of civil liability for defamation post-mortem, that there are 
five states—Colorado, Idaho, Georgia, Louisiana, and Nevada—that 
retain criminal statutes regarding defamation of the dead.125 One of the 
most prominent reasons for allowing such post-mortem defamation 
prosecutions does not appear to be related to economic motivations. 
Rather, the deceased’s family and heirs would want to preserve the truth 
of their relative’s reputation, to keep the record straight.126 Brown, 
opposing such laws, however, notes that the boundaries of such a cause 
of action are difficult to ascertain, and that allowing a cause of action 
for defamation of the dead would hamper historical research.127 
In civilian systems, as might be expected following their more 
dignitary tradition, the law provides for actions to protect the memory 
of the deceased, and the honour of his heirs, spouse or legatees.128 In 
Germany, Criminal Code, Section 189,129 prohibits violating the 
memory of the dead. Further, under § 823(I) of the German Civil Code, 
defamation could be perceived as unlawful interference with “other 
rights” or protected under general personality rights.130 Therefore, given 
Germany’s monistic conception of personality rights under which both 
persona and economic aspects of personality rights survive death, as 
seen above, rights to sue in defamation can survive the death of the 
claimant. 
C. Moral Rights 
Moral rights are interesting to look at in the context of post-
mortem privacy as the dignitary or reputational side of the economic 
institution of copyright. In some ways, these rights straddle the gap 
between personality interests based on tort, as in the European 
personality rights discourse discussed above, and those based on 
 
124 Lisa Brown, Dead But Not Forgotten: Proposals for Imposing Liability for Defamation of the 
Dead, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1531(1989). 
125 Orsi, Defamation: Tort or Crime? A Comparison of Common Law and Civil Jurisdictions, 9 
DARTMOUTH L.J. 19, 26 (2011); Iryami, supra note 120, at 1180. 
126 Brown, supra note 124, at 1556. 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law of July 29, 1881 on the 
Freedom of the Press], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCES [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 30, 1881, art. 34, p. 4201. 
129 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL I] 3322. 
130 See Maryann McMahon, Defamation Claims in Europe: A Survey of the Legal Armory, 19 
WTR COMM. LAW. 24 (2002). 
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property, as in the constructed regime of U.S. publicity rights.131 
Famously, moral rights of authors originate from the French legal 
tradition and the concept of droit d’auteur.132 Although the scope and 
extent of moral rights vary considerably within the different civilian 
traditions, the strongest opposition to moral rights has come from the 
United States system, which finds the civilian idea of an inalienable, 
perpetual, non-attachable dignitary right—which needs to be considered 
alongside the economic interests in copyright if creative works are to be 
efficiently exploited—somewhat alien. However, due to the signing of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
limited protection for moral rights has been established in the United 
States.133 The original version of the Berne Convention did not provide 
any protection to artists’ moral rights. In revisions adopted in Rome in 
1928, an article on moral rights was added to the Berne Convention.134 
In subsequent rounds of negotiations, the extent of moral rights 
protection each signatory state must provide as a minimum has been 
reduced based upon pressure from the United States. The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) now interprets Berne as 
implying “that a complete extinction of the moral rights on the death of 
the author is not permitted, [but] Union countries [can] permit one or 
other of the rights comprising the moral right to lapse after this date.”135 
 
131 Beverley-Smith notes that “while the categorisation of the moral right as a specific personality 
right may be disputed, the exploitation of a work which interferes with the author’s moral right 
raises similar questions as the exploitation of other aspects of personality.” See BEVERLEY-SMITH 
supra note 73, at 112. Interestingly, Black, in her model scheme for a Scots law of personality 
rights, chooses to categorise them not as privacy or property rights but as akin to an IP right in 
being limited monopolies. BLACK, supra note 73, at 147–49. 
132 See Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the 
United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’S New Performances 
Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213 (2006); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and 
the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361 (1998); Michael W. Carroll, Whose Ownership Is It Anyway?: 
How We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 
(2004).  
133 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised 
at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (entered into force for the United States March 1, 1989).  
134 The new provision declared:  
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said 
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to 
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 41 (1978) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE 
BERNE CONVENTION], available at ftp://ftp.wipo.int/pub/library/ebooks/historical-ipbooks/ 
GuideToTheBerneConventionForTheProtectionOfLiteraryAndArtisticWorksParisAct1971.pdf 
(quoting Berne Convention, supra note 126, art. 6bis, ¶ 1).  
135 See generally GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION; see also Dillinger, supra note 122, at 903 
(noting that interestingly, this “was apparently a concession to the fact that protection of moral 
rights in common-law countries would be provided in part through the law of defamation, and 
that no common-law cause of action exists for defamation of a dead person.”).  
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Accordingly, in the United States federal implementation of moral 
rights in 1990 recognised only the rights of attribution and integrity for 
creators of visual works, lasting for the lifetime of the creator.136 
However, the Act makes it clear that state laws providing protection to 
moral rights after an artist’s death remain in effect and are not pre-
empted by the new federal law.137 
By contrast, civilian systems, again in line with their dignitary 
tradition, tend to award clear, extensive and long-lived moral rights to 
creators of all kinds of literary and artistic works. The moral right is 
perceived “as a natural and personal right rather than as a purely legal 
right,” deriving “from the French belief that artists pour a part of their 
soul into their work, creating a personal link between themselves and 
their creations.”138 Thus in France, creators’ moral rights are perpetual, 
as a consequence of the dualistic conception of copyright mentioned 
earlier (i.e., a separate treatment of economic and moral rights); in 
Germany, moral rights last as long as economic rights, as a consequence 
of their monistic conception.139 In the United Kingdom, moral rights 
(including the right to privacy of certain photographs and films) also 
subsist as long as copyright in a work subsists, except for the right 
against false attribution of work, which only lasts until twenty years 
after a person’s death.140 However, as in the United States, moral rights 
in the United Kingdom have been watered down, and though they still 
cannot technically be assigned, they can be waived141 and frequently are 
(e.g. in publishing contracts). Moral rights thus represent a significant 
route through which post-mortem preservation of personality interests 
in privacy, honour and reputation can be guaranteed well after the death 
of a creator in civilian systems, but are likely to be limited in scope or 
signed away in common law systems where publication of a creative 
work is undertaken by an intermediary. 
 
136 See Visual Artists Rights Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5130 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (2012)). 
137 See Jill R. Applebaum, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based 
on the French Droit Moral, 8 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 183, 210 & n.197 (1992). For more on the 
state moral rights laws in existence at that time, see Edward J. Damich, State “Moral Rights” 
Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291, 323 (1989). 
138 Dillinger, supra note 122. 
139 For a useful comparison between English, French and German law attitudes to moral rights, 
see S. Newman, The Development of Copyright and Moral Rights in the European Legal Systems, 
33 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 677, 677–89 (2011). 
140 See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 77–86 (Eng.) [hereinafter CDPA]; see 
also L. Bently & B. Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 167 (3d ed. 2008); Hector MacQueen et 
al., Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy, 104–18 (2d ed. 2011). 
141 See CDPA § 87; see also Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of 
Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 49 (1994); David Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 7 INT’L J.L. INFO. 
TECH. 270, 270–78 (1999). 
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D. Data Protection 
EU data protection (“DP”) law is arguably the most important 
legal instrument for protection of informational privacy in Europe—
both offline and online, and against both state and private actors—and 
has been a model for informational privacy throughout many other parts 
of the world.142 It is currently going through a substantial and 
controversial process of reform to meet the challenges of the digital era, 
which is hoped to culminate in a new Data Protection Regulation 
(“DPReg”) in 2014.143 It is, unlike in the United States, an “omnibus,” 
rather than sectoral, privacy protection regime. The complex rules are 
found in the EC Data Protection Directive (“DPD”),144 and in its later 
extension the EC Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 
(“PECD”).145 The DPD is required to be implemented in substance into 
the national laws of each EU state, though local legislatures have 
substantial autonomy in how they do this. EU DP law is currently 
explicitly founded on the right to respect for the private life of 
individuals protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”)146. 
DP law aspires to give “data subjects” control over the 
“processing” of their “personal data.”147 The DPD defines personal data 
as, “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’)” where an identifiable person is “one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
 
142 See, e.g., GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION (James B. Rule & G.W. 
Greenleaf eds., 2008). 
143 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (25.1.2012) [hereinafter Data 
Protection Regulation (DPReg)]. 
144 Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data 23/11/1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31–50 [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive (DPD)]. For a longer introduction to the DP regime, see Edwards, supra note 9, chs. 
14–16.  
145 Council Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 and Amending Council Directive amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal 
Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy 
in the Electronic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on Cooperation 
Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws 
[hereinafter Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive (PECD)]. These changes were to 
be implemented in the E.U. by May 25, 2011, however, many states have been late to meet this 
deadline. 
146 See supra note 144, ¶ 10. 
147 In addition, the law provides a large number of associated post-collection rights such as the 
right to access one’s personal data and correct it for errors; the right to have it kept securely; the 
right not to have it used for cold calling without consent. See supra note 144, Art. 2(a).  
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physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”148 This 
definition of personal data is contested in scope both across different 
EU states, and in the current reform process, but it certainly extends to 
cover many of the digital assets discussed in this Article, such as e-
mails and social media profiles. Processing is defined very widely to 
include “any operation or set of operations performed upon personal 
data,” including, but not restricted to: collection, recording, 
organisation, storage, alteration, retrieval, use, disclosure or deletion of 
personal data.149 
Thus, it can be seen that DP law is an important viable route by 
which European Web users might attempt to control the collection and 
use of their personal data associated with the creation, storing and 
sharing of digital assets. As seen above in Part III however, on 
intermediary platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc., the 
fair and lawful processing requirement DP imposes, and specifically 
grounds for processing, is usually regarded as met by the consent 
granted by a user when registering to use the platform. Such consent, 
given as part of a standard term, non-negotiable consumer contract, is 
most likely not sufficient to meet the DPD’s requirements of that 
consent being a “freely given specific and informed indication of [the 
user’s] wishes,”150 but presently no formal challenge in the European 
Court of Justice has ascertained this.151 
The DPD, understandably given its fundamental connection with 
Article 8 of the ECHR which itself applies, like other human rights, 
only to the living,152 only protects personal data of “natural persons,” 
usually interpreted to mean the living. However, given the discretion in 
implementation any directive affords to EU member states to offer more 
than the minimum protection required to its own nationals,153 some EU 
states have nonetheless used DP law to offer some kind of post-mortem 
data protection, even if limited in its scope, and for a restricted period of 
time after death. Only a few member states have, however, taken 
advantage of this possibility. Bulgaria recognises that in event of death 
 
148 DPD, art. 2(a). 
149 DPD, art. 2(b). 
150 DPD, art. 2(h). 
151 See generally Edwards, supra note 24; Opinion of the Working Party on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Article 29 WP, Opinion 15/2011 on 
the Definition of Consent, 01197/11/EN, WP 187 (July 13, 2011). 
152 Jäggi v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Estate of Kresten 
Filtenborg Mortensen v. Denmark, App. No. 1338/03, 2006-V Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006); Koch v. 
Germany, App. No. 497/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). 
153 See Case C-101/01, Criminal Proceedings Against Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971, I-13027 
(European Court of Justice decision deferring to the national court’s resolution of the issue) (“On 
the other hand, nothing prevents a Member State from extending the scope of the national 
legislation implementing the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas not included within the scope 
thereof, provided that no other provision of Community law precludes it.”).  
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of the natural person “his or her rights . . . shall be exercised by his or 
her heirs,”154 thus extending the subject’s rights of access to personal 
data, for example, to the heirs of the data subject. The Estonia Personal 
Data Protection Act goes even further, giving a considerable amount of 
freedom to data subjects to decide in advance of death what uses of their 
personal data they will consent to.155 In Section 12 it states: “[t]he 
consent of a data subject shall be valid during the life of the data subject 
and thirty years after the death of the data subject, unless the data 
subject has decided otherwise.”156 Furthermore, in Section 13(1), it 
entitles certain family members to permit processing of personal data 
after the death of the data subject, but again for no more than thirty 
years after death.157 
Conversely, the Swedish Personal Data Protection Act explicitly 
restricts personal data rights to the living, defining personal data as “all 
kinds of information that directly or indirectly may be referable to a 
natural person who is alive.”158 Similarly, the UK Data Protection Act 
1998 defines personal data as “data which relate to a living 
individual.”159 This is by far the majority approach, with the term 
“natural person” generally transposed without alteration. The Article 29 
Working Party, which comments authoritatively, though not bindingly, 
on interpretation of the DP regime, has stated that: “[i]nformation 
relating to dead individuals is . . . in principle, not to be considered as 
personal data, subject to the rules of the Directive.”160 However, the WP 
also noted that, in certain cases, the deceased’s data could receive some 
kind of protection from DP law where protection could be awarded 
indirectly (since the data of the deceased could be connected to those of 
a living person), and that it is in the discretion of member states to 
extend the scope of national legislation, as already noted.161 
In general, though, the reluctance of states to extend DP rights to 
the dead matches the perceptions, canvassed above, that such rights, as 
highly personal to the data subject, should by their nature, die with 
them. Where interests such as family reputation, morals or economic 
inheritance of the living are affected after the death of the data subject, 
other institutions such as criminal defamation laws, moral rights, 
 
154 Personal Data Protection Act, Jan. 1, 2002, State Gazette [SG] No. 1/4.01.2002, at Art. 28(3), 
as amended (Bulg.), available at http://legislationline.org/topics/country/39/topic/3. 
155 Personal Data Protection Act, Oct. 1, 2003, Riigi Teataja [RT] I 2003, 26, 158, amended by 
RT I 2004, 30, 208 (Est.), available at http://www.legaltext.ee/text/en/X70030.htm. 
156 Id. § 12. 
157 Id. § 13. 
158 Personal Data Protection Act (SFS 1998:204) § 3 (Swed.), available at http://www.
sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/55/42/b451922d.pdf. 
159 Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, Part I § (1)(e) (U.K.). 
160 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 
01248/07/EN, WP 136, at 22. 
161 Id. at 16, 22–23. 
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copyright or personality rights may instead provide a remedy. Where 
personal data is shared with the relatives of a deceased (e.g., genetic 
data) they will have their own rights to exercise as living persons. 
Accordingly, it seems that even within the current protracted reform of 
the DPD, there has been little support for the extension of DP to protect 
post-mortem informational privacy, and some explicit opposition. The 
European Commission Proposal for the General Data Protection 
Regulation does not mention deceased persons or their data at all.162 
However, the current draft definitions of personal data and the data 
subject, in Article 4 of the Proposal, cover only natural persons’ data, as 
in the current DPD.163 Moreover, in the revised version proposed by the 
Council of the European Union in June 2012, deceased persons were 
explicitly excluded as data subjects, which stated: “[t]he principles of 
data protection should not apply to deceased persons.”164 The most 
recent European Parliament Draft Report, however, does not contain 
this amendment, so the final result remains open; however, expansion of 
the rights of the deceased under DP law certainly seems highly 
unlikely.165 
One key issue here, as with personality (and publicity) rights, 
would be the practicalities of such post-mortem DP rights. Who would 
exercise them on behalf of the deceased data subject, and for how long? 
Should they exercise them as trustees, with reference only to the 
supposed wishes, expressed or implied, of the deceased, or according to 
their own wishes or the desires of the surviving family? What would the 
consequences be for the autonomy and freedom of expression of the 
living, and the public and historical record? We return to these 
implementation points below. 
E. Freedom of Testation 
Finally, some authors argue that freedom of testation is another 
aspect of the testator’s personality rights. As such, Sonnekus argues that 
freedom of testation cannot be detached from an individual, nor 
delegated to or transferred from another person.166 Similarly, other 
 
162 See generally Proposal for Regulation, supra note 143. 
163 Id. art. 4. 
164 Revised Recital 23, Council of the European Union, Letter from the Presidency to Working 
Party on Data Protection and Exchange of Information, 2012/0011 (COD), Brussels, June 22, 
2012, available at http://amberhawk.typepad.com/files/blog_june2012_eu-council-revised-dp-
position.pdf. This amendment was advocated by the Council representative of Sweden, a country 
that already explicitly excludes the deceased’s data, see supra note 158. 
165 See Amendments 14 and 84 in Draft report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individual with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2012/0011(COD), Dec. 17, 2012 
(Rapporteur: Jan Philipp Albrecht). 
166 Jean C. Sonnekus, Freedom of Testation and the Aging Testator, in EXPLORING THE LAW OF 
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writers characterise freedom of testation as the manifestation of private 
autonomy, having a considerable effect on the emancipation of the 
individual.167 It may seem somewhat odd, therefore, that countries that 
provide more protection for personality rights (i.e., civilian countries) in 
general restrict freedom of testation more than countries that, arguably, 
provide less protection for personality rights (i.e., common law 
regimes). For example, in Scotland, a mixed jurisdiction, but one with 
strong civilian roots to its property law, whether a person dies testate or 
intestate, the surviving spouse and children have rights known as prior 
rights (statutory) and legal rights (common law) over the moveable 
estate.168 In England, by contrast, even after a series of legal reforms, 
freedom of testation reigns, and dependents that are not heirs under the 
will only have discretionary rights to a share of the estate based on 
need, not entitlement.169 
Freedom of testation is thus usually assumed to be much more 
limited in civilian systems than in common law countries. The 
theoretical basis of unlimited freedom of testation in common law 
stems, it is thought, from liberal, laissez-faire economic and social 
thought.170 In civilian countries, by contrast, there is an emphasis on 
kinship, society and the rights of blood, with the result that certain 
family members (typically blood children and family, but also 
sometimes now including a spouse or partner) are given indefeasible 
claims to a part of the testator’s estate regardless of testate disposition. 
These principles come from ethical, philosophical and natural law 
thought, which argue for “solidarity between generations,”171 as 
opposed to the economic and market rationale of common law. 
 
SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 78, 79 (Kenneth Reid, 
Marius J de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh University Press 2007) (citing J 
Goebel). 
167 See M. J. de Waal, The Social and Economic Foundations of the Law of Succession, 8 
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 162, 169 (1997); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law 
of the Dead: Property, Succession and Society, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 340, 355 (1966) (asserting 
“The power of disposition is felt psychologically to constitute an essential element of power over 
property.”). 
168 MICHAEL C. MESTON, THE SUCCESSION (SCOTLAND) ACT (5th ed. 2002). 
169 See Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, c. 63 (Eng.). 
170 See, e.g., François du Toit, The Limits Imposed Upon Freedom of Testation by the Boni 
Mores: Lessons from Common Law and Civil Law (Continental) Legal Systems, 11 
STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 358, 360 (2000); Marius J. de Waal, A Comparative Overview, in 
EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE, 
supra note 166, at 1, 14.  
171 De Waal, supra note 170, at 15. 
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V. SITUATING POST-MORTEM PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ASSETS WORLD: 
ANALYSIS 
A.  Arguments for Post-Mortem Privacy 
Should the privacy of the deceased have legal protection of some 
kind? We started this Article in Part I with three hypothetical scenarios, 
grounded in real or typical facts, which would inspire most non-
lawyers, we suspect, to think that it should, or might. More generally, 
and less intuitively, we might argue that the digital and Web 2.0 world 
has created a new set of circumstances where rights of post-mortem 
privacy, previously little regarded in law, are now of increasing 
importance to everyday folk. Some might argue that there have always 
been disputes over post-mortem publication of unpublished novels and 
letters against the wishes of the deceased and so nothing very new is 
going on here.172 Darrow and Ferrera, for example, note that private 
letters, diaries, and photographs can already be inherited and may 
contain information concerning the deceased that is as private as any 
found in e-mails.173 We would, however, argue that a number of factors 
demand the reconsideration of post-mortem privacy in a digital world, 
including the volume of digital assets preserved after death; the 
accessibility, durability, shareability, and co-construction (shared 
ownership) of those assets; and the lack of authorial control over those 
assets (which are instead subjected to intermediary control). 
More than ever before, “ordinary people,” leave digital relics 
which may be highly personal and intimate, and are increasingly 
preserved and accessible in large volume after death. As a global 
average, respondents to a 2011 McAfee survey had 2,777 digital files 
stored on at least one digital device, with a total value of $37,438.174 
Once, only public figures would have left letters or other personal 
writings of concern, or accessible, to anyone other than their most 
immediate friends and family; now everyone on Facebook leaves 
potentially intimate records of their life (and details of the lives of 
others, who may survive them) exposed to the entire world after death. 
Similarly, in the past, letters containing compromising matter could 
 
172 See McCallig, supra note 1; The Inside Story of Nabokov’s Last Work, supra note 3.  
173 See Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I 
(1977); Humphreys v. DeRoss, 790 A.2d 281, 289 (Pa. 2002) (Castille, J., dissenting) (“Personal 
belongings, letters, mementos, family photographs and the like are all common bequests . . . .”). 
174 See McAfee Reveals Average Internet User Has More Than $37,000 in Underprotected 
‘Digital Assets’, MCAFEE (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.mcafee.com/hk/about/news/2011/q3/
20110927-01.aspx. Assets included: entertainment files (e.g., music downloads), personal 
memories (e.g., photographs), personal communications (e.g., e-mails or notes), personal records 
(e.g., health, financial, insurance), career information (e.g., resumes, portfolios, cover letters, e-
mail contacts) and hobbies and creative projects. Regionally, North American respondents (U.S. 
and Canada) had the highest perceived value of their total digital assets, with an average cited 
value of $52,154 ($54,722 in the U.S. alone). Id. 
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have been easily destroyed or left with strict instructions to destroy to 
the estate administrator or literary executor, with a reasonable 
expectation of being kept safe from the public gaze. Now, as seen in the 
Ellsworth case, such outcomes are uncertain and left to the discretion of 
webmail company policies and the persistence of the deceased’s heirs. 
Once, many people would have left few, if any, lasting traces of their 
private lives—a few photos, a few letters perhaps and the fading 
memories of their children. Now, the traces of the deceased’s online 
lives are left behind and are intensely durable. 
As is often said, “Once it was hard to remember; now it is hard to 
forget.”175 Digital communications are not easily kept private in one 
place, nor are they easy to destroy or delete from every machine or 
server where they may have been written, stored or sent. Instead, as 
intangible digital assets, they can be copied, mirrored and spread around 
the globe in minutes. In such form, and via such universal and speedy 
distribution channels, it is more than likely that the author of an 
electronic communication or text, or owner of an identity, name or 
reputation will lose control of what happens to it after their death. It 
may even go “viral,” in an orgy of sharing across the Internet. 
Another key problem is that the ownership and control of digital 
assets, including the right to destroy, share or bequeath, remain 
conflicted and unclear. While this Article has concentrated on privacy, 
it has been obvious that the question is inextricably merged with that of 
ownership or property (indeed the use of the term “digital asset” 
throughout has foreshadowed this), and that the notion of “ownership” 
in the context of a discussion of privacy means more than reciting the 
rules of copyright or property law. Is a Facebook profile owned by the 
subject of the profile, by Facebook or both? Does that determination 
rest on the platform contract or the law of succession? What if person A 
comments on person B’s profile? Does A “own” the comment and thus 
have a right to stop B’s family from deleting it after B’s death? What if 
B’s friends build an entire memorial shrine around person B’s profile, 
as in Scenario 0? Who “owns” the profile then? As we have noted 
repeatedly, factual control (as opposed to legal ownership) invariably 
lies with the intermediary where digital assets are stored. 
 On the subject of ownership, Kasket (a non-lawyer) argues: 
The co-constructed nature of a Facebook profile begs the question of 
whether it represents one person, or a collection of relationships; 
whether it is created by one individual, or by many; and whether the 
digital representation of self that is conveyed by it should be viewed 
 
175 See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE (2009); DPReg, infra note 179 (regarding 
the debate over the “right to forget”).  
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in the same way as other constituents of that person’s physical estate 
or intellectual property.176 
She moves on to claim that thus friends (usually ignored in 
intestate succession) as well as family may have a right to a say in the 
future of a memorialised profile; and that the issue at hand is not just the 
privacy of the deceased, or the family, but the “relationship privacy” of 
all those who had digital relationships with the deceased. 
Looking at justifications for post-mortem privacy rights from 
policy, legal history and culture, key notions seem to be that the living 
are entitled to shape their image and protect their dignity (and that of 
their family) after death; that, following the principle of freedom of 
testation, the wishes of the deceased should be respected; and that 
protecting the privacy of the deceased also protects the mourning 
family. But does the law support these notions? The survey of 
personality laws in Part V gives rise to some general observations. 
B. Legal Analysis of Part V 
From an Anglo-American common law perspective, the main 
thread of legal doctrine around post-mortem privacy, albeit one that is 
somewhat frayed around the edges, is that property and economic 
interests survive death, while personality interests do not, and should 
not. The long recognised principle of actio personalis moritur cum 
persona still reigns, alongside Beverley-Smith’s representative 
comment from the common law world that “reputation and injured 
dignity are generally of no concern to a deceased person.”177 The most 
archetypical example of this is the failure of claims in defamation to 
survive death, despite a few paradoxical post-death criminal defamation 
laws in the United States. The hostility of the United States to extending 
the scope of moral rights in the face of international harmonisation on 
the matter also fits squarely into, and further supports, this pattern of 
opposition to legal protection of post-mortem pure persona interests. 
On the other hand, the civilian tradition seems more sympathetic to 
post-mortem privacy, through its historical and cultural development of 
doctrines of personality rights. The German system, in particular, has 
historically been inclined to recognise the persistence of rights to 
protect reputation, honour and dignity after death as a fundamental part 
of its constitutional as well as private law. Meanwhile, the French 
system, which fathered the notion of droit d’auteur and moral rights, is 
less convinced on the post-mortem persistence of privacy rights per se, 
but strongly champions a creator’s (or rather his heir’s) interest in 
protecting the integrity of his creation after death, which may well 
 
176 Kasket, supra note 1. 
177 See BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 73. 
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operate as a surrogate. 
Image rights, of course, are the classic case where a melange of 
what seems to be a classic property right designed to facilitate 
commercial exploitation, and a right as deeply entrenched in an 
individual as their face or fingerprints, baffles both academic and 
practical lawyers, civilian and Anglo-American alike.178 In the United 
States, home of Hollywood and the celebrity, we see a paradoxical 
halfway house in the institution of statutory and common law publicity 
rights, looked upon jealously but cautiously by the English, lacking a 
firm notion of commercial appropriation of personality yet terrified of 
creating common law rights of privacy. But publicity rights, even where 
they are designed to survive the death of the person protected, are still 
intended, in the main, to protect economic not persona rights, property 
not privacy. They were introduced to facilitate commercialisation of 
image, not image itself, and not to protect anything like German notions 
of dignity or French notions of moral authorship, integrity and 
attribution. The figures noted above on the sheer value of assets 
protected by publicity rights, as well as the tendency of publicity 
statutes to protect only the revenue streams of celebrities (and their 
assignees) rather than the privacy of non-celebrities makes this plain. 
Despite the tantalising statement in Haelan that publicity rights were 
not necessarily conceived of as property rights, that is how they have 
come to be viewed, albeit with limitations (e.g., the restrictions on post 
death transmissibility, either absolutely, or in relation to duration). 
Finally, European law, coming out of a European tradition of 
respect for the right to private life in Article 8 of the ECHR, provides, in 
data protection law, the strongest laws in the world  for granting 
individuals (whether celebrities, non-entities or whatever) control over 
their personal data. Such rights might be argued to be just what is 
needed to protect the post-mortem privacy of data subjects in a digital 
world. The current DPReg process has, for example, given a great deal 
of publicity to the notion of a “right to forget.”179 (In fact, such a right 
exists to a very large extent in current DP law, albeit without practical 
support, since if consent to processing of personal data is withdrawn, 
then continued processing no longer complies with the provisions of the 
Directive, and the data subject has the right to demand the data be 
erased.)180 If the soldier in Scenario 0 and the novelist in Scenario 0 had 
been able to give a standing notice with binding force to the service 
 
178 For examples of the perplexed literature in this field, see supra note 73. For a discussion on 
how personality rights are difficult for civilian not just common law analysis, see BRUGGEMEIER, 
supra note 73, ch. 2 (“[P]ublic law recognises fundamental rights . . . . Private law provides for 
subjective rights . . . . Civil personality rights do not fit into this dichotomy. They are hybrids, 
sort of private human rights.”). 
179 DPReg, supra note 143, art. 17. 
180 DPD, supra note 144, art. 12. 
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providers in advance of death that they wished their personal data in the 
form of e-mails or novel to be “forgotten” after their death (i.e., erased 
by the data controllers who held it, and possibly also “forgotten” by 
search engines or other parties who linked to it, or shared it), then they 
would have had an effective way of compelling both heirs and family to 
respect their post-mortem privacy. Yet, paradoxically, as DP is seen as 
having its foundation in human rights, it is highly unlikely it will ever 
be extended to protect post-mortem privacy in this way. 
Harbinja181 has questioned this human-rights foundation of the EU 
DP regime asserting that many features of the DPReg reform process 
actually suggest a shift in the underlying notion of DP from a purely 
rights-based notion to one more focused on commodification of 
personal data as property of economic value. As an example, she draws 
attention to the rhetoric of personal data as the “new oil” of the Internet, 
and the new proposed right of data portability. Yet, the very notion that 
personal data has value and is not just to be protected by DP as a 
privacy right but as a commodity makes it even less likely in terms of 
realpolitik that DP will be extended to protect the dead rather than 
reduced to firmly exclude them. In the DPReg process, DP law is 
already under fire from the multinational and social media Web 
companies who monetise data as their prime business model; thus, any 
attempt to increase the scope of personal data protected, rather than 
diminish it, will likely be met with very short shrift. 
So we find that in common law, generally, there is little support for 
post-mortem privacy, even in light of the imposition of Continental DP 
doctrine on European common law countries (specifically the U.K and 
Ireland). On the other hand, paradoxically, common law traditionally 
supports the doctrine of freedom of testation to a much greater extent 
than Continental law, which might be seen as enabling the right to 
control post-mortem privacy. In fact, though, most systems, even in the 
common law world, do place certain limitations on total freedom of 
testation. In particular, wishes that may be seen as relating to the 
personal rather than the economic (such as the desire to be buried or 
cremated, or to be an organ donor182), conditional legacies that restrict 
the autonomy of the surviving heirs (“£1,000 to my wife so long as she 
never remarries”), and trusts that waste money on pointless vanity 
without obvious benefit are frequently declared void or ignored on a 
variety of public policy and societal grounds.183 So, a wish that an 
 
181 Harbinja, supra note 1. 
182 See infra Part VI.C.  
183 See, e.g., Rosalind F. Croucher, How Free is Free? Testamentary Freedom and the Battle 
between ‘Family’ and ‘Property,’ 37 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 9 (2012); see also M. Oldham, 
Financial Obligations Within the Family—Aspects of Intergenerational Maintenance and 
Succession in England and France, 60 C.L.J. 128, 128–77 (2001); Robert A. Trevisani & 
William Breen, Restrictions on Testamentary Freedom. A Comparative Study and Transnational 
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unpublished novel be burnt, or all the e-mails on a server be deleted, 
might be regarded as personal rather than economic, and thus not within 
the privilege of freedom of testation. Again, digital post-mortem privacy 
looks likely to be the loser. 
What of civilian law systems? As noted, these are more 
sympathetic to the idea of the transmission of privacy and personal 
interests on death, and less rooted in the idea that only economic 
interests pass on death and can be controlled by the will of a testator. In 
principle, this sounds good for post-mortem privacy: so if the soldier in 
Scenario 0, or the novelist in Scenario 0, or even the teenage girl in 
Scenario 0, had been German, say, would their privacy have been given 
more respect after their death? Could they have found the tools they 
needed to control what happened to their personal data, communications 
or reputation after their death in some variety of personality rights, 
moral rights or defamation remedies? 
Without working through each scenario in detail in this already 
extensive Article, it seems unlikely. The key problem is that of 
globalised intermediarisation. In each of our scenarios, the digital assets 
and thus the post-mortem privacy of the deceased are primarily 
controlled by contracts with social networks based in the United States, 
a common law jurisdiction.184 (This is of course not inevitable: 
Germany has, of course, its own social networks, with headquarters in 
Germany, but in most of Europe it is the large U.S.-based companies 
that dominate the various parts of the Web 2.0 markets. In December 
2012, for example, the top two social networks accessed in Germany 
were Facebook and Google+, with Twitter in fifth place.)185 Thus, the 
problems we noted in Parts III and IV with intermediary law and 
practice relating to post-mortem privacy are also likely to affect many 
 
Implications—USA, 15 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 14, 14–16 (1990); Id. at 20–26; du Toit supra note 
170. In Scotland, see the fascinating Presbyterian trusts case of McCaig v. Univ. of Glasgow, 
[1907] SC 231.  
184 Again, there are clear issues here about jurisdiction, applicable law and enforcement. These 
are touched on briefly in Edwards and Harbinja, supra note 8, § E. We do not have the space to 
engage with this huge topic here but it is worth hazarding that experience shows that U.S. courts 
are unlikely to engage with foreign law doctrines they find unpalatable in U.S.-based Internet 
intermediary cases, even in cases involving foreign nationals or domiciliaries. See, e.g., in re 
Request for Order Requiring Facebook, Inc. to Produce Documents and Things, 923 F. Supp. 2d 
1204 (N.D. Cal. 2012). For a discussion on the debate surrounding foreign court orders seeking 
access to subscriber IDs on Twitter network in U.S. courts, see Edwards & Matwyshwn, Twitter 
(R)evolution: Privacy, Free Speech and Disclosure, IW3C2 WWW 2013 CONFERENCE 
COMPANION (May 13, 2013), http://www2013.org/companion/p745.pdf. 
185 See The German Social Networking Landscape, COMSCORE DATA MINE (Feb. 8, 2013), 
http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2013/02/the-german-social-networking-landscape/ (last 
visited May 12, 2013). The fourth and fifth places went to Xing, which appears to be the 
European equivalent of LinkedIn with 76% of page views coming from Germany 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XING) and Stayfriends, which appears to be German or at least 
European-based. See StayFriends.de, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Sept. 24, 2013), http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/StayFriends.de. 
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users based in civilian legal systems. If our soldier, our novelist and our 
teenager had been German but still using the services of Yahoo!, 
CloudDrive and Facebook then the same results, at least initially, would 
have followed. 
C.  Against Post-Mortem Privacy: The Organ Donation Dilemma 
So far in this Article, we have supported and argued the view that 
post-mortem privacy in the digital era is worthy of legal respect, and 
surveyed what rights users have to control it. At this point, however, it 
is useful to consider what arguments there are against post-mortem 
privacy rights. Effectively, such arguments have already percolated 
through in the survey of comparative personality laws in Part V, since 
underlying the preference of the common law to see personal interests 
die with the deceased lie a number of obvious policy concerns. 
First, it might be said that protecting the privacy or rights of the 
dead may conflict with the wishes and needs of the living, which should 
in the nature of things take priority. More subtly, throughout intellectual 
property (“IP”) literature it is often argued that monopoly rights should 
not be given over pure information to the detriment of continuing 
societal interests, and that this is what providing property rights in 
privacy, transmissible on death, does. In essence, there is a fear that 
personality rights as transmissible property will confer protection on 
objects that conventional IP law refuses to protect, namely, facts,186 and 
thus, will potentially restrict access to the public domain, fatally 
upsetting the balance IP attempts to achieve between incentivising 
inventions and creativity (whether based on utilitarian theories or 
Lockean labour theories) and on the other hand, protecting freedom of 
expression and access to knowledge by preserving a non-proprietary 
public domain. American writers such as Lemley,187 Hammond,188 and 
Besen and Raskind189 have thus spoken out strenuously against the 
propertisation of information, even in contexts where it has many 
attractions such as providing a “trespass” remedy against website 
scrapers,190 or an earned exclusive scoop in newspapers for “fresh 
news” they have uncovered.191 
 
186 Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The 
general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communications to others, free as the air to 
common use.”). 
187 Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545 (2000). 
188 R. GRANT HAMMOND, QUANTUM PHYSICS, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
TO INFORMATION, 27.  
McGill L.J. 47 (1981). 
189 Stanley M Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual 
Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1991). 
190 See, e.g., Register.com v. Verio, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
191 See, e.g., Int’l News Serv, 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Perhaps the strongest argument here, in the European context, is 
that post-mortem privacy might impede freedom of expression. 
Archives and the historical record would be less complete if personal 
data were cloaked by privacy post-mortem. Society has a right to know 
about its history and what art and literature its deceased citizens have 
left, as a matter of public interest.192 Similar debates about the value of 
privacy and personal data control versus the preservation of the 
historical record and freedom of speech have haunted the “right to 
forget” debate in the draft DPReg process (though it is fair to say these 
arguments have been most diligently pursued by U.S. companies 
dependent on monetising data, such as Google, rather than home-grown 
European delegations).193 
Finally, as already briefly raised above in Part V.D., giving rights 
in personal data to the deceased creates severe practical problems.194 
Who is to give the consent of the deceased to use of their personal 
data—what heirs or representatives, and for how long? Are the heirs 
required to give consent as they wish, or only in accordance with what 
they think the wishes of the deceased were? How can conflicts between 
different family members be resolved, or those between family 
members and partners or friends? How can service providers know what 
requests are genuine and which are backed by law? As noted above, 
presently, service providers request a variety of information from 
relatives, from newspaper obituaries to death certificates to mere 
knowledge of the deceased’s e-mail address. Scenario 0 illustrates one 
of the difficulties that might emerge given the rather para-legal laissez 
faire service-based system that currently exists. Formal recognition of 
protection of the personal data of the dead would surely require a more 
rigorous approach to be taken.195 
A final illustration or exemplar of the difficulties of granting rights 
to the dead at the possible expense of the living might be drawn from 
the law and practice of organ donation on death. Here, there has 
historically been a tendency to prefer the wishes of the living, who 
 
192 See Mazzone, supra note 8, at 1652–60. 
193 See Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, Peter Fleischer: Privacy…? 
(Mar. 9, 2011), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-
oblivion.html. 
194 See Molly Wilkens, Privacy and Security During Life, Access after Death: Are they Mutually 
Exclusive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1037 (2011). 
195 See Mazzone, supra note 8, at 1665–66 (describing varying policies among different 
websites; for example, Gmail requires a rigorous material production before they will let heirs 
obtain a deceased’s e-mails as opposed to the complete lack of information given by Google 
regarding how to obtain disposition of a Blogger blog after death  and citing LinkedIn as requiring 
a “verification of death” form to close their LinkedIn profile). Facebook has already had to deal 
with cases of hoax requests for deletion on death as a kind of “denial of service” attack. See Eric 
Limer, It’s Super Easy To Lock People Out of Their Facebook Accounts by Claiming They’re 
Dead (Updated), GIZMODO (Jan. 4, 2013, 4:17 PM) http://gizmodo.com/5973270/its-super-easy-
to-lock-people-out-of-their-facebook-accounts-by-claiming-theyre-dead. 
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remain to suffer emotional distress (and to sue hospitals), over the 
expressed wishes of the deceased. For example, in England, if the 
deceased indicates a wish to donate (e.g., has a Kidney Donor card in 
his possession) but his family wishes for him to be buried intact, then 
generally the wishes of the family take precedence.196 In Scotland, 
interestingly, the law has been changed since 2006 to clearly support the 
alternative position.197 This might be regarded as a victory for rights of 
post-mortem privacy (or freedom of persona-related testation), but in 
actuality, the pressing factor has been the societal need for organs in an 
age of increasingly successful transplantation technology and an aging 
and unfit population. Currently, in the United Kingdom around a third 
of the population are on organ donation registries, a rise of around fifty 
percent over the last five years, but in around forty-five percent of 
cases, the family has over-ridden the wishes of the deceased and 
forbade donation.198 As a result, donated organs remain at critically low 
levels. 
In the revised Scottish system, “the main principle underpinning 
the new legislation is that a person’s own wishes should be acted on.”199 
It is clear though that the main driver is not patient autonomy, but organ 
scarcity.200 Nearest relatives will still need to be approached to find out 
if there are any medical reasons why transplantation should not go 
ahead, but where the wishes of the deceased (including children aged 
twelve or over) at the time of death are clear, they cannot be vetoed by 
the family. In Wales, an even more radical system is in the process of 
 
196 Note that this is a mixture of law and hospital practice reflecting social norms. See HUMAN 
TISSUE AUTHORITY, CODE OF PRACTICE 2: DONATION OF SOLID ORGANS OR 
TRANSPLANTATION ¶ 96–100 (last revised Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.hta.gov.uk/
legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.cfm?FaArea1=cust
omwidgets.content_view_1&cit_id=674&cit_parent_cit_id=669. Sally Johnston, NHSBT’s 
director of organ donation explained:  
Legally, let us be clear, if you have given consent (for organ donation after death), your 
family can’t overrule it . . . . Practically, we have always tended to err on the side of 
not openly upsetting families. You want families to be proud of their relatives’ decision 
and be happy with it. 
James Meikle, Organ Donation: Drive to Prevent Families from Overriding Donor’s Wishes, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/apr/11/organ-donation-
drive-prevent-overriding. 
197 See Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006 (U.K.); see also HUMAN TISSUE AUTHORITY, HUMAN 
TISSUE (SCOTLAND) ACT 2006: A GUIDE TO ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NHSSCOTLAND ¶ 14 (last 
updated July 2010) [hereinafter Scotland Guidance], http://www.hta.gov.uk/_db/
_documents/Information_about_HT_%28Scotland%29_Act.pdf. 
198 See Meikle, supra note 196.  
199 See Scotland Guidance ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 
200 See NHS Blood and Transplant, TAKING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION TO 2020: A UK 
STRATEGY 5 (last visited Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/to2020/resources/nhsbt_
organ_donor_strategy_summary.pdf (“The UK can and must do more to save and improve lives 
through organ donation and transplantation. The NHS still does not support some people who 
want to donate and more can be done to ensure that donated organs are used.”). 
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being adopted, known as “soft opt-out.”201 Persons are given the option 
of registering as organ donors, or registering explicitly not to be organ 
donors. If they die making no choice, then hospitals are entitled to 
regard their omission as giving deemed consent to organ donation.202 
What is interesting here is that, in the conflict between the wishes 
of the deceased and the rights of the living, what has proved victorious 
are the needs of society. What light does this cast on our digital privacy 
scenarios? In Scenario 0, we might argue that the societal need for a 
supply of great novels outweighs the qualms of the now shuffled-off 
deceased. We have seen some support for this in the reaction to stories 
like those of Nabokov,203 and Kafka, who instructed his literary 
executor, Max Brod, to burn, unread, all of his writings immediately 
after his death.204 Brod, however, did not do this, thereby preserving for 
posterity classics such as The Trial and The Castle.205 If Kafka’s novels 
had been stored on DropBox, or our imaginary CloudDrive, we would 
be glad if that intermediary had preserved them rather than following 
instructions to delete. On the other hand, in Scenario 0, we might follow 
Kasket’s line and argue that society increasingly has an interest in the 
preservation of “virtual mourning places” after death, and that as there 
is no economic loss to the heirs (and little cost to the intermediary), the 
societal interest should take precedence over the wishes of the family to 
shut the site down. In Scenario 0, it is hard to tell what the societal 
interest is. How do we know that the U.S. soldiers’ e-mails will not in 
the end be more precious to the historical record than our author’s novel 
is to the literary record (there are, after all, many bad unpublished 
novels in existence). All of these are highly subjective responses and 
quite different justifications might be adduced (and probably would be 
by the more Continental-inclined member of the writing team). In short, 
we are not convinced that societal arguments get us much further here 
in clearly and objectively finding a way forward for digital post-mortem 
privacy rights. 
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
We have argued above that although the law, at least in common 
law systems, has traditionally paid little or no attention to the protection 
of post-mortem privacy, the new circumstances of the digital world, and 
in particular the emergence of a new and voluminous array of “digital 
assets” created, hosted and shared on Web 2.0 intermediary platforms 
and often revealing highly personal or intimate personal data, require a 
 
201 See Human Transplantation (Wales) Act, 2013 (U.K.). 
202 Id. at §4. Certain exceptions to the rule of deemed consent are preserved. 
203 See supra note 3. 
204 See Lior Jacob Strahilievitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J 781, 830–31 (2005).  
205 Id. 
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revisiting of this stance. If only economic, not personal, interests are 
protected on death, then notwithstanding the problems identified in Part 
VI, serious social issues may emerge lacking legal remedies, some of 
which we sought to illustrate with the scenarios at the start of the 
Article. 
In the early case law we have seen in the United States, such as 
Ellsworth, lacking a firm theoretical or cultural foundation for post-
mortem privacy protection in U.S. law, we see the natural emergence of 
a property-based focus to the resolution of what can quite validly be 
seen as privacy-related disputes. In the academic and journalistic 
commentary written about the case as well as the legislative response 
thereto, the issue has been characterised as being about the digital 
estate—the rights of the family to inherit their son’s e-mails as if they 
were his hard copy letters—not the pros or cons for the deceased son, or 
for the family as a whole, of ignoring Yahoo!’s privacy policy. While 
post-mortem privacy interests were protected in the in re Facebook 
case, this was mainly an incidental result of protection intended for the 
living, combined with the desire of the intermediary to protect itself 
from legal risk. In cases not apparently yet reported via judicial opinion 
in the United States (or elsewhere in the common law world), such as in 
Scenario 0 of this Article, control over memorialisation and access to 
the secrets of the deceased seems to be viewed primarily as an extra-
legal discussion between an omnipotent intermediary and surviving 
family, with little attempt, except in the potential future case of 
Google’s Inactive Account Manager, to ascertain what the deceased 
would have wanted.206 It seems likely that in future disputes that impact 
post-mortem privacy, arguments will revolve mainly around this tension 
between rights granted to intermediary platforms by their own 
unilaterally dictated terms of service, and rights of property and 
administration granted to heirs by the laws of succession and executry. 
Neither side of this conflict has much time for the privacy of the 
deceased. 
A basic issue here of course (which we have sidestepped till now) 
is that if the privacy of the deceased is at odds with the economic or 
personal desires of the heirs, then who is to represent the deceased? In 
Europe, one answer might be the national Data Protection Authorities 
(“DPAs”) who are already charged with championing the rights of data 
subjects during life. In the United States, it is much harder to see who 
 
206 As this Article was about to go for review, a new U.S. case on an executor seeking access to 
e-mails stored with Yahoo! webmail emerged. See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, 12-P-178 (Mass. Ct. App. 
May 7, 2013). The case seems to be primarily based on a paradigm of e-mails as property 
(whether chattel, copyright, or both). See Eric Goldman, Yahoo’s User Agreement Fails in Battle Over 
Dead User’s Email Account—Ajemian v. Yahoo, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 9, 2013, 8:52 AM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/05/yahoos_user_agr.htm. Future work will explore this case 
further. 
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might take this role, though the appointment of some kind of curator ad 
litem (ad mortem?) seems not impossible. An executor asked to take 
this role might find herself asked to make impossible choices between 
her duties to the heirs, to whom she is a fiduciary, and the wishes of the 
deceased. 
In civilian countries, we detect a slightly different pattern. Because 
of the historic respect for the honour and dignity of the dead as well as 
for the integrity of the creator as part of the systemic constitutional and 
human rights culture, there is arguably a greater chance of protection for 
post-mortem privacy being fitted into existing personality rights 
discourse, as opposed to being recast as a question of property law or 
simply disregarded. (This should not however be overstated: as seen 
above, even France has been reluctant to develop a notion of post-
mortem privacy rights per se.). This bears more investigation, and we 
hope to look at emerging Continental practice in this area in our further 
work. But as noted above, many disputes involving the digital assets 
and post-mortem privacy of nationals of civilian legal systems are in 
any case likely to be fought, whether in or out of court, according to 
U.S. rules. 
Future work might consider what solutions, if any, there might be 
to the problem of protecting post-mortem privacy in the common law 
world. One obvious solution is legislation. The Ellsworth case inspired 
a large number of laws to be passed fairly rapidly, protecting the rights 
of heirs and their legal representatives. Additional laws could also be 
passed considering the privacy rights of the deceased. It seems likely, 
however, that the living have more of a lobby as voters than the dead. 
The other avenue for regulation is contract (and contract that 
influences code). As noted in our survey in Part 4 above, the Web 2.0 
marketplace currently mainly lacks contractual norms helpful to post-
mortem privacy, though pace the Yahoo! policy which led to the 
Ellsworth dispute. Google’s Inactive Account Manager, which can be 
seen as reading into the contract, via code, terms about disposal of data 
on death, is a positive step forward; however, too much celebration has 
to be forestalled since it is known that many users, with customary 
inertia, will still not make use of its facilities. As in the organ donation 
debate, the question then might be what inference should be drawn from 
silence. If Inactive Account Manager is set by default to “delete all my 
stuff on death” then we have an effective requirement for positive opt-
out of post-mortem privacy. If, however, it is set to a default of “do 
nothing when I’m dead,” unless altered, which appears to be the case, 
then effectively we have created a need to opt in to post-mortem 
privacy.207 As with all discussion of social media contracts, part of the 
 
207 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, 
Edwards-Galleyed-FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/22/13  1:51 PM 
2013] PROTECTING POST-MORTEM PRIVACY 129 
problem is the well-researched point that conventional market 
competition is failing to produce a range of options for consumers 
(where, for example, is ZombieTalk, the social network that cares about 
you by default when you are dead?). 
One final thought might be that the above discussion has perhaps 
identified two notably different types of post-mortem privacy claims. 
One might be termed “negative post-mortem privacy”—the right to 
keep matters secret after death. In some ways this corresponds to the 
classic Warren and Brandeis conception of privacy as the “right to be let 
alone.”208 A second type of claim might however be termed “positive 
post-mortem privacy”—the right to control one’s image or brand after 
death. This latter concept arguably fits far better into the common law 
property paradigm, as well as the civilian notion for respect for dignity 
and honour after death, and thus is much more likely to command legal 
protection within the frameworks we have analysed. Indeed, one could 
easily imagine it protected under some of the existing U.S. publicity 
statutes. On the other hand, “negative” post-mortem privacy seems to 
fare badly in both the common and civilian world, judging by the small 
sample of the extra-legal results for Nabokov and Kafka and the lack of 
enforceable defamation and confidence remedies after death. Is this a 
real dichotomy? Is there a difference worth enshrining between keeping 
a secret and promoting an image? If so, is it one we want to respect? Or 
is there an argument on instrumental grounds that secrets are as worthy 
of protection as image? We hope also to return to this in further work. 
 
Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2006) (discussing 
the power of defaults in the online world).  
208 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
